Keysight Technologies, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, No. 25-137 (Fed. Cl. July 2, 2026)

The United States Court of Federal Claims has held that the Department of the Treasury lacked the statutory authority to promulgate Treasury Regulation Section 1.951A-2(c)(5), which sought to deny amortization and depreciation deductions on assets transferred during the "disqualified period". This controversy arose from what the court characterized as the "Treasury’s self-inflicted fix of a mismatch between foreign subsidiaries with fiscal- or calendar-year tax filing requirements that Congress quietly built into the global intangible low-taxed income ('GILTI') statutory scheme".

By granting partial summary judgment to the taxpayer, the court’s decision in Keysight Technologies, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States represents a landmark post-Chevron application of the statutory interpretation principles established in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). For tax professionals, including CPAs and EAs, the decision provides a critical blueprint of how federal courts will scrutinize Treasury regulations that seek to rewrite clear statutory provisions under the guise of preventing tax-advantaged transactions.

Wepplo v. Comm'r, Docket No. 36722-21, Order (T.C. July 2, 2026); Wepplo v. Comm'r, Docket No. 36722-21, Motion to Redetermine Interest Pursuant to Rule 261 (T.C. Apr. 10, 2026)

Factual Background and Procedural Posture 

The underlying dispute in Wepplo v. Commissioner originates from a settled deficiency proceeding covering taxable years 2015, 2016, and 2017. Following a trial calendar date in February 2024, the parties reached a settlement, the Court entered a decision on May 12, 2025, and the petitioners subsequently satisfied the assessed deficiencies along with all related interest. Recognizing that the Internal Revenue Code permits post-decision interest disputes under specific conditions, the petitioners filed a motion within the statutory window. As noted in the petition, "Because this motion is being filed within one year of when the Decision became final, this motion is timely under Rule 261(a)(2)." The Court concurred with this jurisdictional threshold, observing that "petitioners paid the tax owed, including all related interest. They then moved, within one year of doing so, for an order under Rule 261 for a redetermination of interest. This appears to establish jurisdiction for a decision on their motion under that Rule and IRC § 7481(c)." The procedural posture thus hinges entirely on whether the Commissioner’s interest computations properly account for statutory postponement periods and standard interest calculation mechanics.

Matter of Edward A. Zelinsky et al. v. Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the State of New York et al., CV-25-1156 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. July 2, 2026)

The matter of Edward A. Zelinsky et al. v. Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the State of New York et al. involves a challenge to the application of New York’s "convenience of the employer" rule during the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioner, Edward A. Zelinsky, a law professor and attorney employed by Cardozo Law School, is a resident of Connecticut. During the 2019 and 2020 tax years, Zelinsky performed his professional duties both on the New York campus and remotely from his Connecticut home.

In 2020, Zelinsky worked on campus for 24 days between January and March. However, on March 20, 2020, Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.8, which directed nonessential businesses to "reduce in-person workforce levels by 100% and to implement telecommuting and remote work 'to the maximum extent possible'" (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.8 [9 NYCRR 8.202.8]). Consequently, Zelinsky performed the remainder of his duties for the 2020 tax year from his Connecticut residence.

Region IV Mental Health Services v. United States, No. 3:26-CV-12-RPC-JMV, 2026 WL ___ (N.D. Miss. July 1, 2026)

The controversy in Region IV Mental Health Services v. United States centers on the Employee Retention Credit (ERC) provided under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Specifically, the plaintiff, Region IV Mental Health Services (Region IV), sought refundable tax credits for employment taxes for the first, second, and third quarters (Q1, Q2, and Q3) of 2021.

On October 24, 2022, Region IV filed administrative refund claims totaling $5,381,683.35 for these three quarters. On June 5, 2023, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a refund for Q2 2021 in the amount of $1,990,593.87. However, following a subsequent review, the IRS issued a letter on April 17, 2024, disallowing the ERC refund claims for all three quarters. Region IV protested this disallowance. While the taxpayer claimed the IRS did not directly communicate the final decision, the IRS issued an assessment for Q2 2021 to recover the previously refunded amount. The IRS subsequently provided letters stating the protests were denied and notifying the taxpayer of the right to challenge the determination in a United States District Court or the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Suvarna v. United States, No. 25-902T (Fed. Cl. July 1, 2026)

The United States Court of Federal Claims has dismissed a taxpayer's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction despite compelling and sympathetic personal circumstances. In Suvarna v. United States, Chief Judge Matthew H. Solomson ruled that the court has no discretion to suspend the administrative statute of limitations under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6511(a) for any reasons other than the taxpayer's own personal "financial disability" under I.R.C. § 6511(h). This decision serves as an essential, high-stakes reminder for Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) and Enrolled Agents (EAs) that third-party illnesses, no matter how severe, cannot toll the statute of limitations for an administrative tax refund.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Investment Lineup for Trump Accounts (July 1, 2026), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0551

On July 1, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a formal announcement regarding the investment lineup for the newly established Trump Accounts. This initiative is designed to facilitate long-term savings for American families, specifically aiming to provide "the lowest cost options available to invest in their childrenʼs future" (U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 2026). The Treasury has established a structured investment framework that prioritizes low-cost, diversified index funds to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and to maximize the efficiency of the accounts.

Key Meetings, Inc. v. United States, Case No. 25-cv-06520-WHO (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2026) and Juggler Dave & Friends, LLC v. United States, 181 Fed. Cl. 52 (2026)

The retroactive termination of the Employee Retention Credit (ERC) for the third quarter of 2021, enacted under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), has survived two major constitutional challenges in the federal courts. Enacted on July 4, 2025, Section 70605(d) of the OBBBA established a retroactive deadline of January 31, 2024, for all claims seeking the ERC for the third quarter of 2021. Under this provision, notwithstanding Section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, "no credit under section 3134 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be allowed, and no refund with respect to any such credit shall be made, after the date of the enactment of this Act, unless a claim for such credit or refund was filed by the taxpayer on or before January 31, 2024" (Pub. L. 119-21, § 70605(d), 139 Stat. 72 (2025)).

This sudden statutory contraction of the filing window has caught many late-filing taxpayers in its net, leading to aggressive litigation under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Two recent decisions—Key Meetings, Inc. v. United States in the Northern District of California and Juggler Dave and Friends, LLC v. United States in the Court of Federal Claims—have solidly rejected these constitutional challenges, establishing a formidable shield for retroactive tax administration.

Besicorp Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket Nos. 23-296(L), 23-299 (Con), 23-302 (Con), 23-321 (Con), 23-353 (Con), 23-359 (Con), ___ F.4th ___ (2d Cir. June 29, 2026)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that an Internal Revenue Service Appeals Officer's failure to verify written supervisory approval for tax penalties during a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing invalidates the collection of those penalties via federal tax liens and levies, even if the underlying liabilities were previously adjudicated. In Besicorp Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Second Circuit reversed a series of Tax Court orders that had sustained IRS liens and proposed levies for millions of dollars in outstanding penalty liabilities. The court's decision establishes a critical boundary between the administrative determination of tax liability and the statutory due process required during the collection phase, reminding tax practitioners that the procedural protections enacted under the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (the "Reform Act") are absolute and must be enforced according to their literal text.

This ruling represents a significant victory for taxpayers contesting IRS collections, clarifying that the government's failure to obtain and verify supervisory approval under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6751(b)(1) is a fatal defect that permanently bars the IRS from using its expedited collection tools—namely, liens and levies—to collect the penalty portion of a tax debt.

Rev. Proc. 2026-25 (June 29, 2026), 26 CFR 601.601; IRC §§ 530A, 2010, 2503, 2505, 2642, 2662, 6019

Under Revenue Procedure 2026-25, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has established a transfer tax safe harbor for certain individual donors making contributions to "Trump accounts" established under Section 530A of the Internal Revenue Code. This administrative guidance clarifies that qualifying contributions are "treated as completed gifts that are not gifts of future interests in property and to which the annual per-donee gift tax exclusion applies," thereby relieving eligible taxpayers of the obligation to file gift tax returns (Form 709) for these transfers. 

RAAM Construction Inc v. United States of America, Case No. 2:25-cv-04681-SPG-AJR, 2026 WL 18391 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2026).

The Employee Retention Credit (ERC) codified under Internal Revenue Code Section 3134 remains a significant source of controversy, audits, and high-stakes federal litigation. While taxpayers often focus on demonstrating that they experienced pandemic-related disruptions, a recent summary judgment ruling from the United States District Court for the Central District of California underscores a more formidable evidentiary hurdle: causation. In RAAM Construction Inc. v. United States of America, Case No. 2:25-cv-04681-SPG-AJR (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2026), the court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on both the taxpayer’s refund claim and the government's substantial clawback counterclaim. This decision provides critical guidance for tax practitioners (CPAs and EAs) on the strict "but-for" causation standard required to establish ERC eligibility under the partial suspension pathway.

Tapestry Senior Housing Management, LLC v. United States, Case No. 25-cv-3419 (LMP/EMB), 2026 WL 18388 (D. Minn. June 25, 2026).

The Employee Retention Credit (ERC) under Internal Revenue Code Section 3134 has been one of the most widely claimed and heavily contested tax relief provisions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. While much of the professional discussion has centered on the substantive eligibility rules—such as the gross receipts test and the partial suspension of operations test—a recent order from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota highlights a critical procedural hurdle: federal pleading standards. In Tapestry Senior Housing Management, LLC v. United States, Case No. 25-cv-3419 (LMP/EMB) (D. Minn. June 25, 2026), the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss a taxpayer’s $3 million refund suit, providing essential guidance for tax professionals on how ERC eligibility must be pleaded in federal court.

Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 310 (2023); Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-52; Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, No. 25-2079 (2d Cir. 2026) (Oral Argument Transcript).

For tax professionals advising private equity funds, hedge funds, and closely held businesses, the ongoing litigation in Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner represents one of the most critical developments in self-employment tax controversy in decades. At the heart of the dispute is whether active, service-providing individual partners in a state-law limited partnership can utilize the limited partner exception of Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section 1402(a)(13) to exclude their distributive shares of ordinary partnership income from self-employment taxes under the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA). With over $140 million in distributive shares at stake in this single case, the controversy has progressed from foundational battles over Tax Court jurisdiction to a high-stakes appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This article provides a highly technical analysis of the two underlying Tax Court decisions, the key items before the Second Circuit appellate panel, the detailed debates and concerns raised by the judges during oral arguments, and the broader compliance and risk mitigation strategies for CPAs and EAs.

Sundancer Pools, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-1291T (Fed. Cl. June 23, 2026).

The Employee Retention Credit (ERC) has been one of the most heavily litigated and audited tax provisions in recent history. Originally enacted under Section 2301 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020), and later codified as amended at I.R.C. § 3134, the ERC was designed to provide a refundable tax credit against employment taxes for employers facing severe economic hardships during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the statutory framework provides multiple pathways to eligibility, the most contentious has been the "full or partial suspension" prong under I.R.C. § 3134(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

In Sundancer Pools, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-1291T, the United States Court of Federal Claims addressed critical threshold issues regarding what constitutes a "full or partial suspension" and the standard of causation required to prove that such a suspension was "due to orders from an appropriate governmental authority." For CPAs and Enrolled Agents (EAs) advising clients, this case serves as an essential case study on the pleading standards necessary to survive government motions and the rigorous legal thresholds that courts are applying to ERC refund suits.

Office of Professional Responsibility, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Alert Issue No. 2026-19, Introductory Guidelines for Responsible AI Use in Federal Tax Practice (June 24, 2026).

The IRS Office of Professional Responsibility on June 24, 2026 issued an Alert dealing with the use of artificial intelligence in tax practice (U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Alert Issue No. 2026-19, Introductory Guidelines for Responsible AI Use in Federal Tax Practice).

The rapid integration of artificial intelligence ("AI") has transformed modern law and accounting offices. While traditional AI tools—such as advanced legal research products and document review platforms—have been ubiquitous for years, the emergence of generative artificial intelligence ("GAI") introduces a paradigm shift. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) defines AI fundamentally as "the use of machines in a way that mimics human cognitive skills, including judgment, perception, and prioritization". Unlike legacy analytical software, contemporary GAI platforms "have the ability to make discretionary decisions, devoid of any human interaction". This autonomy stems from "GAI’s use of complex pattern-recognition capabilities that continually interact and evolve, allowing the program to learn from itself". Although these tools offer transformative potential—such as "cost savings, rapid data analysis," and advanced government risk assessment applications—they also pose profound ethical, regulatory, and legal hazards for federally authorized tax practitioners.

Tooke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-54, June 23, 2026

The United States Tax Court recently issued a memorandum opinion in Tooke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-54, providing critical guidance on the scope of an Appeals Officer's discretion during Collection Due Process (CDP) hearings, specifically regarding the rejection of Offers-in-Compromise (OIC) and Partial-Pay Installment Agreements (PPIA).

Albert S.N. Hee and Wendy R. Hee v. Commissioner; Waimana Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-53 (June 23, 2026)

In the realm of closely held corporations, the line between personal and business expenses is frequently a focal point of Internal Revenue Service examinations. When a controlling shareholder treats a corporate treasury as a personal pocketbook, the tax consequences can escalate from simple disallowances to civil fraud penalties under Internal Revenue Code Section 6663. The United States Tax Court decision in Hee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-53, serves as an instructive and sobering case study for Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) and Enrolled Agents (EAs) on the critical importance of corporate formalities, the strict substantiation requirements of Section 274(d), and the mechanics of the civil fraud penalty.

Plastic Film, LLC v. United States, Civil No. 5:25-cv-30-DCB-LGI (S.D. Miss. June 22, 2026)

The Employee Retention Credit (ERC) has been one of the most heavily scrutinized tax provisions of the pandemic era. As the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) continues its sweeping compliance and enforcement efforts, a pivotal question has emerged in federal courts: what procedural avenues must the government use to recapture allegedly improper ERC refunds? In Plastic Film, LLC v. United States, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed this critical issue, holding that the federal government is not restricted to administrative assessment procedures under 26 U.S.C. § 6205 when seeking to recapture improper ERC refunds. Instead, the court affirmed that the government retains its long-standing right to pursue civil recovery actions for erroneous refunds under 26 U.S.C. § 7405(b). At the same time, the court clarified that when the government asserts a civil recoupment counterclaim, it must meet federal plausibility pleading standards by alleging specific facts demonstrating ineligibility rather than merely relying on conclusory statutory recitations.

Sleiman v. Commissioner, No. 19155-24 (T.C. May 6, 2026) (oral findings of fact and opinion rendered pursuant to T.C. Rule 152)

For tax professionals representing clients in joint and several liability disputes, the United States Tax Court’s bench opinion in Sleiman v. Commissioner offers critical guidance on two of the most complex areas of I.R.C. § 6015: nominal business ownership and the application of the domestic abuse exception to the "reason to know" standard. This case highlights how de novo judicial review can successfully look past corporate paperwork and nominal listings to identify the true economic and behavioral realities of a marital household.

Notice 2026-40, Internal Revenue Service (June 2026).

For practitioners advising clients on Qualified Opportunity Zone (QOZ) investments under the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), the regulatory landscape has recently undergone a major transformation. Sections 1400Z-1 and 1400Z-2, originally enacted under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 and subsequently amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018), have been substantially modified by Section 70421 of Public Law 119-21, 139 Stat. 72 (July 4, 2025), commonly referred to as the "One, Big, Beautiful Bill Act" (OBBBA).

To address critical timing mismatches and transition issues resulting from these amendments, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Notice 2026-40. This Notice serves as transitional administrative guidance ahead of forthcoming proposed regulations, outlining how both investors and Qualified Opportunity Funds (QOFs) must adjust their compliance and tax planning strategies.

Because this guidance is administrative rather than judicial, there is no presiding judge or court case associated with its release. However, to maintain the rigorous, technical standards of our profession, this article details the facts, statutory mechanics, and administrative determinations set forth in Notice 2026-40, making extensive use of direct quotations from the text of the Notice to illustrate the IRS's formal positions.

United States v. Royce, No. 3:17-CR-158, Memorandum Opinion (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2026)

For tax practitioners, representing clients in federal tax controversies involves navigating not only administrative audits but also, in extreme cases, the federal criminal justice system. When an individual is convicted of tax-related offenses and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by supervised release, the transition back to civilian life is heavily regulated. Understanding the legal mechanism of supervised release and the criteria for early termination is crucial for CPAs and Enrolled Agents (EAs) who advise clients during post-conviction rehabilitation.

In the case of United States v. Donald Royce, 3:17-CR-158 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2026), the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed a motion for early termination of supervised release filed by Donald Royce, a former CPA. The court's memorandum opinion, written by District Judge Robert D. Mariani, provides a meticulous analysis of the statutory factors governing early discharge under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Despite Royce's compliance with his release conditions, the court denied his request, highlighting that mere compliance represents the minimum expected conduct rather than an extraordinary circumstance justifying early termination. This case serves as a poignant reminder of how pre-sentencing behavior, such as malingering and a lack of genuine contrition, can negatively impact a practitioner's standing before a federal court.