This post has been revised to incorporate comments the author received regarding the potential application of Reg. §1.162-12 to resolve the issue independently of how the Court actually decided the case.

In Agro-Jal Farming Enterprises, Inc. et al v. Commissioner, 145 TC No. 5 the Tax Court was asked to determine if a farmer reporting on the cash basis of accounting could claim a deduction for packaging materials as payment was made for the materials or if the taxpayer rather could only deduct the amounts as the materials were used.

Sometimes it takes a while for the Tax Court to issue a decision on an issue that you might have thought would have been addressed previously.  Such is true with regard to the issue of valuing net income makeup charitable remainder unitrusts (NIMCRUTs) created under IRC §664.  In the case of Estate of Schaefer v. Commissioner, 145 TC No. 4, the Tax Court addressed this issue.

In Revenue Procedure 2015-39 the IRS had provided a safe harbor method of accounting that taxpayers filing on the accrual basis may use to determine economic performance on certain service contracts.

In the case of Illinois Lumber and Material Dealers Association Health Insurance Trust v. United States, 116 AFTR 2d ¶2015-5079, reversing DC MN, 113 AFTR 2d ¶2014-1937 the appellate panel had to deal with the complex area of the law found in the statute mitigation provisions of IRC §§1311-1315.  The appellate determined that the taxpayer, having failed to assert its rights before statute initially expired, could not “awaken the sleeping dog” of the statute of limitations bar on any refund.

The implications of the provision found in IRC §6501(c) regarding the statute of limitation on assessing tax when the IRS is faced with a fraudulent tax return is generating much action and disagreement among the courts about exactly whose fraudulent intent can trigger the extended statute and what the nature of such a fraud must be to do so.  Since triggering §6501(c) gives the IRS an unlimited period of time in which to assess the tax, the matter is one of true concern if, truly, a taxpayer may find him/herself stuck with the statute due to a fraud committed that they weren’t aware of.

Filing a Tax Court petition regarding a tax assessment carries risks, some of which an adviser may not normally consider.  In the case of Estate of Billhartz v. Commissioner, No. 14-1216, 2015 TNT 143-12 the issue that arose came after the estate had entered into a settlement with the IRS.

Under IRC §6512 a taxpayer who files a petition with the Tax Court regarding a proposed tax deficiency may not later file a claim for refund—rather, all issues need to resolved in the Tax Court case.  That’s true even for issues that may come to the taxpayer’s attention following the conclusion of the case. 

The taxpayer in the case of Stout v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2015-133 was looking to obtain capital gain tax treatment for the payment he received for the stock incentive units (SIUs) he held in his employer at the time the employer was acquired by another entity.  But it turns out that the fact that SIUs are similar to rights in the stock won’t qualify the taxpayer for capital gain treatment—unlike a game of horseshoes, here close is simply not good enough.

In Chief Counsel Advice 201529008 the IRS noted that while a loss sustained in an automobile accident might normally appear to meet the definition of a casualty loss, that won’t be true if your business is a car rental operation.

In the matter discussed in this advice a car rental company had been claiming as a casualty loss the amount of loss incurred when a customer had bought the company’s damage waiver, become involved in accident and the rental car company determined that they were not going to repair the vehicle and return it to their fleet.  So the question became whether the company was properly classifying the loss they incurred in this case.

The “kinder, gentler” IRS seems to be making a limited return in the area of IRS waivers of late IRA rollovers.  Recent rulings have taken a broader view than the IRS did in the past of a financial institution “error” for which the IRS deem to meet the test in Revenue Procedure 2003-16.  An example of a rather broad view of financial institution error is found in PLR 201530024.

Whether a taxpayer or an S corporation the taxpayer used to own, but which was now owned by an ESOP, actually made charitable contributions was one of the matters at issue in the case of Zavadil v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-222. The Tax Court’s decision limiting his deduction to the amounts he had actually repaid the corporation (not ones where his repayment was immediately paid for by a new corporate advance) for deductions made in the year in question was sustained on appeal by the Eighth Circuit (Docket No. 14-1053, 2015 TNT 137-14)

The IRS has issued proposed regulations (REG-115452-14) that will establish a series of tests to determine if an arrangement will be treated as a disguised payment for services under IRC §707(a)(2)(A).  The key test, based on the section’s legislative history, will be whether the payment is subject to significant entrepreneurial risk.

An IRS full unilateral concession of the case is not a settlement, per the Ninth Circuit, and thus the taxpayer was prevailing party for purposes of Knudsen v. Commissioner, No. 13-720077, 2015 TNT 136-13 reversing the Tax Court’s contrary holding in an earlier ruling in the same case (TC Memo 2013-87).