The oral arguments in Learning Resources, Inc., et al. v. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. (No. 24-1287) focused on three primary areas of legal dispute: the interpretation of the statutory text of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the applicability of constitutional doctrines like the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD) and the Nondelegation Doctrine (NDD), and the scope of the President's authority in foreign affairs and national emergencies [6:15-18, 55:7-12].

Key Provisions of the Law and Constitution Raised

The key provisions of law and the Constitution raised during the arguments were:

Statutory Interpretation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)

Justices extensively questioned whether the authority to impose tariffs is encompassed within the language of IEEPA, specifically the phrase "regulate... importation" [5:21, 25:17, 35:7, 53:4].

Justice	Key Questions / Concerns Raised
Justice Sotomayor	Questioned the government’s core position that tariffs are not taxes, noting that tariffs generate revenue from American citizens [12:16-21]. Asked why Congress did not explicitly use the words "tariff" or "tax" in IEEPA if it intended to delegate that power, noting that historically Congress typically uses both "tax and regulate" simultaneously [15:7-14, 54:10-12]. She questioned the government’s reliance on "regulate importation" because the clause applies conjunctively to "importations and exportations," yet Congress cannot constitutionally place taxes on exportations [32:1-15]. Justice Sotomayor also noted that no other president in IEEPA’s history had used tariffs as a power under the Act [54:1-4].
Justice Kagan	Challenged the assertion that tariffs exercised here are merely "regulatory" and not "revenue-raising" [30:11-12]. She questioned if the word "regulate," when used alone in the Code, includes taxing power [30:13-15]. She pointed out that Congress specifically removed other verbs (like "confiscate" and "vest") from the predecessor statute, and crucially, none of the remaining verbs (such as "block" or "prohibit") refer to raising revenue [29:15-22].
Justice Barrett	Asked the Solicitor General to identify any other statute in history that uses the phrase "regulate... importation" to confer tariff-imposing authority, outside of the contested application under the Trading With the Enemies Act (TWEA) in the Yoshida case [25:15-19, 27:5-15]. She questioned why the other verbs in IEEPA like "nullify" and "void" should be described as "capacious," suggesting they have definite, non-revenue related meanings [28:15-22]. Justice Barrett also asked why the President did not structure the exaction as a licensing fee scheme, given that IEEPA specifically references "licenses" as a means of regulation and licenses with fees are economically equivalent to tariffs [45:6-18, 85:21-86:18, 147:16-25].
Justice Jackson	Focused on the legislative intent, noting that IEEPA was designed to constrain presidential authority under the prior TWEA statute, making a broad reading inconsistent with its purpose [18:8-22]. She asked why the statute lists specific verbs (like "investigate, block, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit") if the single word "regulate" functions as a comprehensive "catch-all" to include a major power like imposing tariffs, which is not explicitly listed [93:11-17, 94:3-13]. She noted that the legislative history suggested Congress intended the verbs for actions like "control or freeze property transactions" [41:17-21, 42:8-10].
Justice Kavanaugh	Pressed the government on the significance of the Nixon tariffs (imposed under TWEA’s "regulate importation" language and upheld by the CCPA in Yoshida) [23:3-4, 77:6-14]. He asked why subsequent Presidents (Clinton, Bush, Obama) have not used IEEPA for tariffs if the authority was clearly re-enacted into IEEPA in 1977 [78:13-17]. He also questioned the difference between a quota (conceded to be authorized) and a tariff, noting the government’s interpretation creates an "odd donut hole" where extreme measures are allowed but calibrated tariffs are not [164:21-165:12].
Justice Gorsuch	Questioned the challengers' argument that "regulate importation" cannot include tariffs on the basis of plain language, noting that "regulate commerce" was historically understood to include the power to tariff (citing Justice Story and Madison) [134:24-135:2]. He also questioned the argument against using "otherwise" (in "licenses, or otherwise") to authorize tariffs, given that licenses can sometimes be revenue-raising and are economically equivalent to tariffs [136:4-14, 139:12-16].
Chief Justice Roberts	Questioned the Solicitor General’s reliance on Dames & Moore due to the prior opinion's explicit claim of narrowness and the fact that it did not concern tariffs [10:14-11:10]. He pointed out the constitutional tension when the President’s foreign affairs power clashes with Congress's core power to tax, suggesting that tariffs, though foreign-facing, are still an imposition of taxes on Americans [37:2-11].

Constitutional Doctrines and Separation of Powers

Justices raised core constitutional issues under the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD) and the Nondelegation Doctrine (NDD), particularly concerning the scope of power delegated to the Executive Branch under Article II [6:13-16, 55:7-12].

Justice	Key Questions / Concerns Raised
Justice Gorsuch	Asserted that if the government wins, the power becomes a "one-way ratchet" toward executive accretion, making it nearly impossible for Congress to take back the power through normal legislation due to the President’s veto [72:7-14, 74:11-14, 88:23-89:12]. He asked the government to explain the constitutional limit, if any, on Congress delegating power to the President if the doctrines are "less strong" in the foreign context (e.g., delegating the power to lay duties or even declare war) [63:23-65:16]. He used the hypothetical of imposing tariffs on gas-powered cars to combat a climate change emergency, suggesting the government’s interpretation leads to sweeping, potentially unlimited, executive power [69:1-10].
Justice Kagan	Noted that the NDD test often applied arose from a tariff case (J.W. Hampton), suggesting that tariffs are not an exception where the doctrine applies with "less force" [55:22-56:6, 57:23-25]. She observed that the IEEPA power lacks the "real constraints" (like percentage caps or time limits) commonly found in traditional tariff statutes in Title 19, raising a delegation problem [60:3-9]. She also questioned whether the NDD issue is heightened because Congress enacted IEEPA believing it had the safeguard of a legislative veto, which was later invalidated [131:18-25].
Chief Justice Roberts	Questioned why the MQD does not apply, arguing that a power to impose tariffs on "any product from any country for... any length of time" is major authority, especially when derived from a statute that does not explicitly use the word "tariffs" [34:2-18, 35:3-7].
Justice Alito	Pressed the challengers on whether they would maintain their position—that the President lacks tariff authority—even in an undisputed, dire emergency where tariffs were imposed solely for deterrence and not revenue generation (e.g., an imminent threat of war) [115:1-116:5, 174:19-175:12]. He also raised the possibility that Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 might provide an alternative legal justification for the tariffs, noting that the government had not invoked it but amici had [120:19-25].
Justice Jackson	Questioned the scope of judicial review over the President’s finding of an "unusual and extraordinary threat" (IEEPA Section 1701) [95:17-96:25]. The government asserted its frontline position is that the finding is committed to the President's discretion (unreviewable, citing Trump v. Hawaii and Dalton v. Specter), but offered that any review would be highly deferential [96:16-25, 201:1-4].

Nexus to Declared Emergencies

In addition to broad delegation concerns, Justices questioned whether the specific tariffs implemented were appropriate tools for the declared emergencies.

Justice Barrett questioned why the reciprocal tariffs were applied to close allies (e.g., Spain, France) if the declared emergency concerned threats to the U.S. defense and industrial base due to asymmetric trade [90:10-14].
Justice Jackson asked how tariffs (imposed on lawful goods) were an appropriate sanction to address the drug trafficking emergency (the fentanyl crisis), given that IEEPA and TWEA history typically involved imposing sanctions directly on wrongdoers or assets [183:19-184:13].

Key Items of Dispute Regarding the Statutory Interpretation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act

The statutory interpretation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) was the central dispute in the oral arguments, revolving primarily around whether the President's authority under IEEPA includes the power to impose regulatory tariffs [5:21, 53:4, 76:17].

The core issue of interpretation focused on the statutory phrase "regulate... importation" in IEEPA (50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)) [5:21, 15:1].

Key Items of Statutory Interpretation Dispute

The federal parties (Respondents/Government) argued that the phrase "regulate importation" plainly embraces tariffs, as they are a traditional and direct method of regulating importation [5:22-24, 35:7-8]. The private parties and state parties (Petitioners/Challengers) argued that tariffs are fundamentally taxes, a core power exclusively committed to Congress under Article I, and are categorically different from the sanctions powers delegated in IEEPA [12:18-21, 55:17-19, 97:10-13, 115:16].

Definition of Tariffs: Regulatory Tool vs. Revenue-Raising Tax

Government's Position: Tariffs imposed under IEEPA are regulatory tariffs, not revenue-raising tariffs (taxes) [10:6-8, 43:3]. The purpose is to regulate foreign commerce, and any revenue generated is "incidental" or "collateral" [10:9, 12:22, 38:20]. The policy objective is most effective if no one pays the tariff because the goal is to direct consumption domestically and spur manufacturing, or to induce foreign powers to change their behavior [39:1-8, 76:1-2, 187:4-7, 188:11-13].
Challengers' Position: Tariffs are inherently taxes because they generate revenue from American citizens (or foreign producers) deposited into the U.S. Treasury [12:20-21, 97:10-13, 101:19, 112:19-20]. Tariffs are revenue-raising and are, therefore, categorically different from embargoes or quotas, which stop the shipment altogether [99:21, 115:16-17, 160:15, 168:4, 172:13]. The constitutional assignment of the taxing power to Congress is the key context [180:4-11, 182:12-16].

Textual Context and Missing Language

Government's Position: "Regulate importation" is a "capacious verb" that, when combined with "importation," naturally confers the power to tariff, based on historical usage going back to the Founding [11:25, 30:18-20, 31:16-17]. They noted that challenging parties concede that IEEPA authorizes quotas, and since tariffs are economically equivalent to quotas, excluding tariffs creates an "odd donut hole" in the statute [5:25, 43:8-13, 165:2].
Challengers' Position: Congress knows how to delegate taxing authority and consistently uses the words "tariff," "tax," or "duty" explicitly when doing so [15:7-13, 17:15-18, 98:11-14, 101:9-11]. The verbs accompanying "regulate" in IEEPA ("investigate, block, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit") pertain to embargo-like controls and freezing property transactions, not raising revenue, suggesting that "regulate" must be read in that restrictive context (ejusdem generis) [16:19-21, 29:21-23, 40:17-20, 100:8-15, 156:20-157:4].

Significance of Historical Precedent (Nixon Tariffs)

Government's Position: The 1971 Nixon tariffs, imposed under the predecessor statute (Trading With the Enemy Act, or TWEA) using the same "regulate importation" language, were upheld by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in Yoshida [21:19-25, 23:10-18]. When Congress re-enacted the language into IEEPA in 1977, it was fully aware that the phrase had been interpreted to include the power to tariff, making the current use "heralded," not "unheralded" [24:17-19, 36:16-18, 77:15-18].
Challengers' Position: They provided five counter-arguments: (1) Nixon did not initially rely on TWEA [22:9-13, 107:6-7]; (2) Yoshida was a single intermediate court case that provided limited precedential value [106:23, 107:25]; (3) Yoshida itself was limited in scope, explicitly calling for future surcharges to comply with later Trade Act limits (Section 122) [50:18-22, 108:23-109:3]; (4) TWEA concerned wartime powers, which the President has greater inherent authority over, unlike IEEPA, which is a peacetime domestic emergency statute [103:17-19, 130:1-4, 150:11-14]; (5) No other president in IEEPA’s history has used tariffs [54:1-4, 77:3-4, 98:21].

Justices' Comments on Statutory Interpretation

The Justices extensively questioned counsel for both sides on these points.

Justice Sotomayor

Justice Sotomayor repeatedly challenged the government's position that tariffs are not taxes, noting they generate revenue from American citizens [12:16-21]. She questioned why, if Congress intended to delegate tariff power, it did not use the explicit words "tariff" or "tax," as it has done in many other statutes (often using "tax and regulate" simultaneously) [15:7-14, 33:7-10, 54:10-12]. She raised a textual concern regarding the conjunctive use of "regulate importation and exportations," noting that Congress cannot constitutionally tax exportations, suggesting this context argues against reading taxing power into "regulate importation" [32:1-15]. She emphasized that no other president in IEEPA’s history has used tariffs under the Act [53:25-54:4, 95:1-2].

Justice Kagan

Justice Kagan questioned the government's assertion that the tariffs were purely "regulatory" and not "revenue-raising," asking if there was any instance in the entire U.S. Code where "regulate," used alone, conferred taxing power [30:11-15]. She observed that Congress, in enacting IEEPA, specifically removed verbs from the predecessor statute (like "confiscate" and "vest"), and none of the remaining verbs (such as "block" or "prohibit") explicitly referred to raising revenue [29:15-22].

Justice Barrett

Justice Barrett pressed the Solicitor General to identify any other statute or historical instance, besides the contested Yoshida application of TWEA, where the phrase "regulate... importation" was used to confer tariff-imposing authority [25:15-19, 27:5-15]. She also explored the language of the means specified in IEEPA ("instructions, licenses, or otherwise"), asking why the President didn't structure the exactions as a licensing fee scheme if licenses and tariffs are, as argued, economically equivalent [45:6-18, 85:23-86:18, 147:16-25].

Justice Jackson

Justice Jackson focused on the legislative history of IEEPA, noting that it was designed to constrain presidential authority under the prior TWEA [18:8-22]. She highlighted Senate and House reports suggesting that Congress intended the listed verbs primarily for actions like "control or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is involved," making a broad reading of "regulate" to include tariffs inconsistent with this specific legislative purpose [41:1-21, 42:7-11, 156:22-157:4]. She questioned why "regulate" should function as a comprehensive "catch-all" to include a major power like tariffs when the statute lists specific, detailed verbs [94:12].

Justice Kavanaugh

Justice Kavanaugh underscored the importance of the Nixon example and the CCPA's Yoshida precedent, asking why, if the same "regulate importation" language was interpreted to include tariffs, Congress did not change the language when re-enacting it into IEEPA [23:3-18, 77:10-18]. He also highlighted the argument that prohibiting trade entirely (an embargo or quota, conceded to be authorized) is a more extreme measure than imposing a small tariff, suggesting that disallowing a tariff would create an "odd donut hole" where a rational Congress authorizes the extreme but not the calibrated response [164:21-165:12, 178:1-15].

Justice Gorsuch

Justice Gorsuch noted that historically, phrases like "regulate commerce" were understood to include the power to tariff, questioning the plain-language argument against the government [134:21-135:4, 136:1-3]. He also questioned the Challengers' narrow interpretation of the phrase "licenses, or otherwise," observing that since licenses can be revenue-raising and are economically similar to tariffs, the word "otherwise" might naturally encompass tariffs [136:4-14, 140:6-10].

Chief Justice Roberts

Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the two-sided nature of tariffs: they are foreign-facing (executive power), but their vehicle is the imposition of taxes on Americans (legislative power), suggesting this tension neutralizes the Executive's inherent advantage in the foreign affairs realm [37:2-11, 102:21-103:10]. He pointed out the major questions doctrine concern, arguing that the power to impose tariffs on "any product from any country for... any length of time" is major authority, and the statute does not use the word "tariffs" [34:12-18, 35:3-7].

Key Items of Dispute Regarding the Applicability of Constitutional Doctrines

The core constitutional disputes during the oral arguments centered on the applicability and scope of the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD) and the Nondelegation Doctrine (NDD) in the context of the President's actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

The central disagreement was whether the President's inherent authority in foreign affairs diminishes the force of these doctrines, particularly when applied to the power to impose tariffs.

Key Items of Dispute Regarding MQD and NDD

Applicability of MQD in the Foreign Affairs Context

Federal Parties' Position: The MQD should not apply (or applies as a "particularly poor fit") in the foreign affairs context because the President, unlike an agency, possesses inherent Article II authority in this realm [6:15-18, 6:22-25, 8:7-9, 55:11-14]. Furthermore, IEEPA is explicitly a statute designed to confer major powers to the President to address major problems, namely international crises and foreign-arising emergencies [7:4-7, 34:21-25]. The government asserted that the authority here is not "unheralded" because the same phrase ("regulate importation") had previously been upheld to include tariffs under the predecessor statute (TWEA, in Yoshida) [36:9-19].
Challengers' Position: The MQD is directly applicable because the power asserted (imposing tariffs on all imports at any rate and for any duration) is a massive, unprecedented, and open-ended authority that Congress would not delegate implicitly [34:12-18, 97:22-98:3, 99:5, 118:3]. Since tariffs are taxes, this power falls squarely under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, the taxing power, which belongs exclusively to Congress [97:10-12, 104:3-4, 182:14]. They argued that the MQD's application is necessary precisely because Congress did not use clear language like "tariff" or "tax" when delegating this foundational legislative power [35:5-7, 113:5-6].

Applicability of NDD and the Foreign Affairs Exception

Federal Parties' Position: The NDD "does not apply with anything like the same force" in the foreign context as it does in the domestic context [48:2-4]. Citing Curtiss-Wright and Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence, the government argued that Congress is expected to grant broad authority to the President in foreign affairs [7:4-9, 48:7-18, 56:8-12]. They maintained that IEEPA meets the NDD requirement because the powers are confined to a specific domain (property involving foreign interests) and include appropriate constraints, such as formal emergency declarations, sunset provisions, and congressional review [59:12-13, 60:16-25].
Challengers' Position: The supposed "foreign affairs exception" to NDD does not apply to tariffs, as the power to tax is a core Article I power, not an inherent Article II power of the President in peacetime [55:16-19, 56:13-16, 70:3-7, 103:16]. They noted that the foundational NDD case, J.W. Hampton, was itself a tariff case, suggesting that tariffs are not exempted from strict delegation analysis [55:22-25, 56:4-6, 141:13]. Critically, the tariffs here lack the "real constraints" (like percentage caps or time limits) found in other tariff statutes, raising a severe delegation problem [60:3-9, 99:1-2, 146:17-25]. They also highlighted that the original safety net Congress relied upon—the legislative veto—was later struck down, leaving the statute without the intended constraints [102:11-15, 131:23-25].

The "One-Way Ratchet" Problem (Retrieval of Delegated Power)

Federal Parties' Position: Congress retains the ability to terminate an IEEPA emergency via joint resolution, noting the termination of the COVID emergency as a recent example of political discipline [60:21-61:1, 73:14-16, 74:16-23].
Challengers' Position: The delegation of tariff power creates a "one-way ratchet" (executive accretion of power) because once the authority is recognized by the Court, Congress can only retrieve it through a veto-proof majority (a supermajority), an exceedingly difficult threshold [72:7-14, 73:24-74:15, 89:3-4, 98:3-8, 116:17-19, 130:11-13].

Justices' Comments on MQD and NDD

Chief Justice Roberts

Questioned why the MQD does not apply, arguing that the power to impose tariffs on "any product from any country for... any length of time" is major authority, especially when derived from a statute that does not use the word "tariffs" [34:2-18, 35:3-7].
Stressed the constitutional tension created when the President's foreign affairs power clashes with Congress's core power to tax, suggesting that this conflict should at least "neutralize" the Executive's inherent advantage in the foreign affairs realm [37:2-11, 103:8-10].

Justice Thomas

Asked the government to explain why the MQD should not apply to the President in this case, specifically inquiring about the "two or three points" supporting the argument that MQD is a "poor fit" in the foreign affairs context [6:13-18].
Asked the government to anticipate and address the delegation argument [47:20-23].

Justice Alito

Questioned the Challengers on whether they would maintain their position—that the President lacks tariff authority—even in an undisputed, dire emergency where tariffs were imposed solely for deterrence and not revenue generation [115:1-116:5, 174:19-22].
Asked the Challengers whether the inherent revenue-raising nature of tariffs (which they claim distinguishes them from embargoes) fundamentally boils down to a suspicion that the Executive is trying to circumvent Congress's power to control taxes [173:13-20, 174:6-11].
Raised the issue of whether the broad phrasing common in emergency powers provisions means they are inherently more open-ended than other statutes, noting the AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) as an example [126:22-127:21].

Justice Kagan

Challenged the government's position that the NDD applies with "less force" to tariffs, noting that the J.W. Hampton delegation test originated from a tariff case, and tariffs are quintessential taxing powers given by the Constitution to Congress [55:22-56:16].
Observed that the NDD issue is heightened because IEEPA, as interpreted by the government, lacks the "real constraints" (like percentage caps or time limits) commonly found in Title 19 tariff statutes, leading to a delegation problem [60:3-9].
Questioned the idea that IEEPA's constraints, such as the emergency declaration, are meaningful when the government asserts that the declaration itself is unreviewable [61:4-11].
Asked whether the subsequent striking down of the legislative veto (which Congress originally included as a check in IEEPA) affects the NDD analysis [131:18-25].

Justice Gorsuch

Strongly pressed the government on the constitutional limits of delegation, asking if the government's foreign affairs theory meant Congress could delegate the power to declare war or abdicate all responsibility to regulate foreign commerce [63:23-65:16]. He observed that the government's position creates a "one-way ratchet" toward executive power accretion, which is difficult for Congress to retrieve due to the presidential veto [72:7-14, 74:11-15].
Used the climate change tariff hypothetical to expose the sweeping nature of the claimed power, pointing out that the government conceded that a 50-percent tariff on gas-powered cars could potentially be imposed under IEEPA if the President declared a climate emergency [69:1-10].
Emphasized that the Challengers' argument is animated by the "constitutional assignment of the taxing power to Congress," which must be addressed by the MQD/NDD analysis [182:14, 183:4-9].

Justice Sotomayor

Questioned the government's argument that an emergency or foreign policy can "do away with the major questions doctrine," referencing Biden v. Nebraska [13:4-8].
Highlighted the "fundamental point" that the Constitution requires citizen taxes to be authorized by Congress (both houses and the executive, via veto), arguing that the broad delegation under IEEPA circumvents this structure [180:4-11].

Justice Barrett

Inquired about the "one-way ratchet" concern, noting that if the Court definitively interprets IEEPA to grant tariff power, Congress would need a veto-proof majority to remove that authority, making retrieval "particularly hard" [88:22-89:12, 89:22-24].

Key Items of Dispute Regarding Presidential Authority

The key disputes concerning the scope of the President's authority in foreign affairs and national emergencies centered on whether the President has inherent Article II authority to impose tariffs, whether IEEPA was intended to grant such broad, foreign-affairs power, and the reviewability of the President's emergency determinations.

The Existence and Scope of Inherent Article II Tariff Authority

The most fundamental dispute was the source of presidential power in this area, specifically regarding the imposition of tariffs [103:14].

Federal Parties' Position: The President possesses his own inherent Article II authority in the foreign affairs realm, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) layers a sweeping delegation of authority (including Article I tools like regulating foreign commerce) on top of that inherent power, placing the President in a position of maximum authority ("Youngstown Zone 1") [6:10, 8:7-9, 9:16-22, 48:22, 49:1-2]. However, the government does not contend that the President has inherent tariffing authority in peacetime [9:16, 70:3, 71:15]. The power being exercised is the power to regulate foreign commerce, not the power to tax [10:6, 43:4, 188:17].
Challengers' Position: The power to impose tariffs is a quintessential Article I power (the power to tax) committed exclusively to Congress [8:24, 17:18, 55:19, 97:12, 104:4, 180:4-10]. Since the President lacks inherent Article II tariff authority in peacetime, the government's position relies solely on the questionable delegation of that power through IEEPA's vague term "regulate importation," placing the action at its lowest ebb of authority [99:3, 103:16-19, 116:8].

Constraints on Delegated Emergency Authority

The parties disputed whether the emergency nature of the statute justified broad interpretation and whether the statute provided adequate limitations.

Federal Parties' Position: Congress is expected to confer major powers on the President to address international crises and foreign-arising emergencies, which is consistent with the broad language of IEEPA [7:4-9, 34:24]. The statute does impose appropriate constraints, such as requiring a formal declaration of an "unusual and extraordinary threat" (IEEPA Section 1701), termination by joint resolution, and congressional oversight [59:12-13, 60:21, 61:1, 62:8, 63:1-2]. The powers granted are also confined to a "particular domain" concerning property in which foreigners have an interest [59:12-14, 62:21-23].
Challengers' Position: In emergency situations, statutes must speak with more precision because "emergencies beget emergencies" [113:17-19, 175:4]. They argued that IEEPA was enacted to limit presidential authority under its predecessor (TWEA), making a broad reading inconsistent with its purpose [18:8-12]. They criticized the lack of "real constraints" (like percentage caps or time limits) commonly found in other trade statutes, arguing this made the delegation impermissible [60:3-9, 99:1, 146:17-25].

Judicial Review of Emergency Determinations

The government and Justices discussed the level of judicial scrutiny applied to the President's finding of an emergency.

Federal Parties' Position: The President's determination of an "unusual and extraordinary threat" (Section 1701) is the core constraint, but their frontline position is that this finding is unreviewable because it is committed to the President's discretion (Dalton v. Specter), or, alternatively, any review would be highly deferential and easily satisfied in this case [96:18-25].
Challengers' Position: The declaration of an emergency is subject to review, and the government's claim that it is unreviewable further exacerbates nondelegation concerns [61:4-11, 102:10]. Tariffs applied in this case were criticized for lacking a proper nexus to the declared emergencies, such as applying tariffs to close allies (Spain, France) when the emergency concerns asymmetric trade threats [90:10-14, 91:9].

Justices' Comments on Presidential Authority

Justice	Key Comments and Positions
Chief Justice Roberts	Emphasized that tariffs are two-faced: they deal with foreign powers (Executive Article II power), but their vehicle is the imposition of taxes on Americans (Legislative Article I power) [37:2-7, 102:20-25]. He suggested this tension should at least "neutralize" the Executive's inherent advantage in the foreign affairs realm, making the delegation subject to scrutiny [37:10].
Justice Thomas	Questioned why the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD) does not apply, asking the Solicitor General to provide the specific reasons why the President's "inherent Article II authority" in foreign affairs makes the MQD a "particularly poor fit" [6:13-25]. He also pressed the government to sketch out the historical line (from TWEA) that justifies interpreting IEEPA broadly [49:2-9].
Justice Alito	Inquired whether the Challengers would maintain their narrow interpretation of IEEPA's powers even in the face of an undisputed, dire emergency where tariffs were imposed strictly for deterrence (e.g., staving off imminent war), and not for revenue [115:1-116:5, 174:19-22]. He raised the possibility that other tariff statutes (like Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930) might provide an alternative legal justification for the tariffs [120:15-25]. He also questioned whether emergency powers statutes are naturally phrased more broadly due to the nature of the crisis [126:22-25].
Justice Kagan	Challenged the assertion that the Nondelegation Doctrine (NDD) applies with "less force" to tariffs, noting that tariffs are a quintessential taxing power assigned to Congress [55:19, 56:13-16]. She observed that IEEPA lacks the "real constraints" (caps or time limits) of Title 19 tariff statutes, heightening the delegation problem [60:3-9]. She also questioned the effectiveness of the emergency declaration constraint, noting the government views it as unreviewable or highly deferential [61:4-11].
Justice Gorsuch	Focused heavily on the consequences of interpreting IEEPA broadly, arguing it creates a "one-way ratchet" toward executive power accretion because Congress would require a veto-proof supermajority to retrieve the power [72:7-14, 98:4]. He asked the government to define the constitutional limit on Congress delegating core powers (like taxing or declaring war) if the NDD is weakened in the foreign context [65:1-16]. He exposed the sweeping nature of the claimed power using the hypothetical of imposing tariffs on gas-powered cars to deal with a climate change emergency [69:1-10]. He also received confirmation from the government that the President does not have inherent authority over tariffs in peacetime [70:3, 71:15, 103:17].
Justice Sotomayor	Highlighted the fundamental structural point that the Constitution requires citizen taxes to be authorized by both Houses of Congress and the Executive [180:4-11]. She questioned whether the President should be permitted to use taxing power to effect his "personal choices" of what constitutes good policy [180:17-19, 181:8]. She also noted that historically, presidential war powers (like those exercised by Lincoln and Nixon in tariff cases) were often followed by congressional ratification, which is absent here [129:1-7, 130:11].
Justice Barrett	Raised the "one-way ratchet" concern, emphasizing that once the tariff power is definitively recognized under IEEPA, it is "particularly hard" for Congress to take it back [89:10-24]. She also questioned the nexus of the tariffs to the emergency, asking why reciprocal tariffs were applied across the board to close allies (Spain, France) [90:6-14].
Justice Jackson	Stressed the importance of the legislative history of IEEPA, which suggested Congress intended the verbs for actions like "control or freeze property transactions" (sanctions authority) and not revenue-raising or taxing authority [41:8-12, 156:24-157:1]. She also questioned the government's position on the reviewability of the "unusual threat" declaration, observing that the government asserted it was likely committed to presidential discretion [95:17-96:25].

To clarify the debate over the breadth of emergency power: the dispute is like arguing over whether a chef, given a general mandate to "regulate the flow of food" in an emergency, can use the most powerful tool (a financial tariff) when they were explicitly given other tools (quotas or embargos), and when historically, the power to financial tariff has always been controlled by the restaurant's ownership (Congress). The government says the emergency dictates all tools must be available; the challengers say the fundamental distinction between taxing and non-taxing tools means Congress must be explicit when handing over the financial power.

Prepared with assistance from NotebookLM.