As tax professionals, we frequently encounter statutory deadlines that dictate our clients’ rights and our obligations. One area of particular interest, especially following a significant Supreme Court ruling, is the doctrine of equitable tolling as it applies to the Tax Court’s filing deadlines. The recent oral findings of fact and opinion in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 18578-17L (Bench Opinion June 12, 2025), provides a practical application of this doctrine following its remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This article will delve into the specifics of this case, outlining the factual background, the taxpayer’s plea for relief, the court’s legal analysis of equitable tolling, and its ultimate conclusions.

Background of the Case

Boechler, P.C., the petitioner, is a sole-practitioner law firm based in North Dakota, principally engaged in plaintiff-side asbestos litigation. The firm is named after its sole attorney, Jeanette Boechler. In the late summer of 2017, the firm’s staff included Ms. Boechler, her sister Lisa, and a part-time administrative assistant. Ms. Boechler managed a substantial caseload, typically around 25 active asbestos cases, many involving 30 or more defendants.

Concurrent with her demanding professional life, Ms. Boechler navigated a complex personal life in 2017. She was a single mother to a son who had just graduated high school and was preparing to leave for college. Additionally, she shared significant caregiving responsibilities for her elderly mother, who was in her late 90s and resided with Ms. Boechler and her sister Lisa. These responsibilities included making meals, transporting her mother to doctor’s appointments, and other household tasks, with assistance from her two sisters. Notably, between August 17 and August 22, 2017, Ms. Boechler traveled to New York to help her son move into his college dormitory and attend parent meetings.

The dispute originated from an ongoing collection action initiated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner). The Commissioner’s records indicated that Boechler had failed to timely file information returns for 2012, leading to the assessment of penalties under section 6721 of the Internal Revenue Code. On October 31, 2016, the Commissioner issued a Final Notice of Intent to Levy to Boechler concerning these unpaid penalties. Following Boechler’s request for an appeals hearing, the Commissioner mailed a Notice of Determination dated July 28, 2017, sustaining the Notice of Intent to Levy. This notice explicitly informed Boechler that to dispute the determination, a petition had to be filed with the United States Tax Court "within a 30-day period beginning the day after the date of this letter".

Boechler’s counsel mailed a petition to the Tax Court 32 days after the date listed on the Notice of Determination, bearing a postmark of August 29, 2017. The Tax Court received the petition on September 1, 2017. The 30-day period from July 28, 2017, would have ended on August 27, 2017, which was a Sunday. Ms. Boechler testified that she miscalculated the deadline, believing it to be August 29th or 30th.

The Taxpayer’s Request for Relief and Procedural Journey

Initially, the Commissioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because Boechler’s petition was untimely. Boechler countered, arguing that the deadline under section 6330(d)(1) was not jurisdictional and was therefore subject to equitable tolling. The Tax Court initially agreed with the Commissioner and granted the motion to dismiss, a decision that was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

However, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and ultimately held that the deadline to petition the Tax Court under section 6330 is not jurisdictional and is indeed subject to equitable tolling. This pivotal ruling led to the case being remanded by the Eighth Circuit on August 4, 2022, specifically for the Tax Court to conduct factfinding on the applicability of equitable tolling. A trial was held on June 10, 2025, focused solely on this issue, with Ms. Boechler as the sole witness. Boechler contended that equitable tolling was warranted, attributing the late filing to Ms. Boechler’s miscalculation of the deadline, which she argued stemmed from her many responsibilities. The Commissioner, conversely, argued that Ms. Boechler’s miscalculation and personal circumstances, while perhaps difficult, were not uncommon, were not beyond her control, and did not rise to the level of "extraordinary".

The Court’s Legal Analysis of Equitable Tolling

The Tax Court, like all federal courts, operates as a court of limited jurisdiction, exercising authority only as expressly provided by statute (I.R.C. § 7442). Section 6330(d)(1) permits a taxpayer to petition the Tax Court to review a notice of determination concerning a collection action within 30 days of such a determination.

Equitable tolling serves to "effectively extend[] an otherwise discrete limitations period set by Congress" [Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014)]. It is considered a traditional feature of American jurisprudence and a background principle against which Congress drafts limitations periods [Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199, 208-209 (2022)]. A crucial takeaway from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner is that nonjurisdictional deadlines are presumptively subject to equitable tolling [Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)]. This presumption can only be rebutted if equitable tolling is inconsistent with the statute’s text or overall statutory scheme [Arellano v. McDonough, 143 S. Ct. 543, 548 (2023); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998)].

The Supreme Court, in its review of this very case, concluded that the 30-day deadline under section 6330 is subject to equitable tolling because:

There was nothing in the text of section 6330 that expressly prohibited equitable tolling.
The short 30-day deadline was directed to the taxpayer, rather than the court.
Section 6330 is an "’unusually protective’ of taxpayers" provision, and litigation under it is often initiated by pro se litigants [Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. at 209 (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 160 (2013))].

Given that the deadline is subject to equitable tolling, the Tax Court’s task on remand was to determine whether the facts and circumstances of this specific case warranted its application. To be entitled to equitable tolling, a taxpayer must establish two key elements:

Diligence: The party must have pursued its rights diligently [Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010))]. This prong requires a litigant to take all reasonable steps to ensure the timeliness of its petition, including actively engaging with their attorney to ensure timely filing [Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1998)]. The litigant must demonstrate they "exercised due diligence in pursuing [their] case" [Pafe v. Holder, 615 F.3d 967, 968 (8th Cir. 2010)].
Extraordinary Circumstances Beyond Control: There must be extraordinary circumstances outside of the party’s control that prevented the timely filing [Menominee, 577 U.S. at 255]. This prong is satisfied only when the circumstances causing the delay are both extraordinary and beyond the litigant’s control [Menominee, 577 U.S. at 257; Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1266 (8th Cir. 1990); Hill v. John Chezik Imports, 869 F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989)].

The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling applies [Menominee, 577 U.S. at 255; Thompson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 919 F.3d 1033, 1036–37 (8th Cir. 2019)]. It is important to remember that equitable tolling is applied sparingly [Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96], and failure to satisfy even one of these elements is sufficient to deny the claim [Menominee, 577 U.S. at 256].

Application of the Law to the Facts

The Tax Court meticulously applied the two-prong test to the facts presented by Boechler:

Failure to Establish Diligence The court found that Boechler did not allege or establish any facts indicating that it diligently pursued its rights. Crucially, there was no evidence that Boechler followed up with its attorney or supporting staff to ensure the timely filing of the petition. During her testimony, Ms. Boechler could not recall if she personally filed the petition or if she supervised or provided direction to the person who did. The record lacked any indication of specific instructions given by or to counsel to ensure timely filing. The court emphasized that a litigant must actively pursue their claim, citing Holland, where a litigant’s multiple follow-ups with his attorney demonstrated diligence [Holland, 560 U.S. at 653–54]. In contrast, the lack of any such evidence meant that Boechler failed to satisfy the first prong of the equitable tolling test.

Failure to Establish Extraordinary Circumstances Beyond Control Boechler argued that Ms. Boechler’s circumstances—being a busy sole practitioner, a single mother, and a caregiver for her elderly mother—constituted extraordinary circumstances. However, the court found this argument unpersuasive:

Caregiving Responsibilities: While Ms. Boechler’s mother was elderly and required assistance, Ms. Boechler had other family members, specifically her two sisters, who also assisted with caregiving responsibilities. The court concluded that this situation did not rise to the level of "extraordinary" so as to warrant equitable tolling.
Oppressive Workload: The court cited precedent that an oppressive workload is not considered an extraordinary circumstance. For instance, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply equitable tolling for a habeas petitioner whose attorney argued an overburdened docket, stating, "we decline to apply equitable tolling just because a lawyer is busy" [Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 2002)]. Given that Ms. Boechler was the sole attorney at Boechler, P.C., she controlled her own workload, and also had co-counsel on several cases. Therefore, her workload was not deemed an extraordinary circumstance beyond her control.
Miscalculation of Deadline: The court underscored that miscalculating a deadline is not an extraordinary circumstance outside of one’s control. Ms. Boechler testified she miscalculated the deadline, not that some external circumstance prevented her from filing on time. Precedent from the Eighth Circuit, where an appeal in this case would ordinarily lie, confirms that an attorney’s miscalculation of a deadline is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling [Christeson v. Griffith, 860 F.3d 585, 588–89 (8th Cir. 2017); Rues v. Denny, 643 F.3d 618, 621–22 (8th Cir. 2011)]. Thus, Ms. Boechler’s miscalculation was insufficient for equitable tolling.

Conclusion

The Tax Court concluded that Boechler satisfied neither of the requirements for equitable tolling. It failed to establish that it diligently pursued its rights, and it failed to establish any extraordinary circumstances outside of its control that prevented a timely petition. As a result, the court determined that the petition was untimely, and equitable tolling did not apply. A decision was therefore entered for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

This case serves as a crucial reminder for tax professionals regarding the stringent standards for equitable tolling. While the Supreme Court’s ruling opened the door for equitable tolling in section 6330 cases, the bar remains high, requiring both demonstrated diligence and truly extraordinary circumstances beyond a litigant’s control, not merely busy schedules or miscalculations. Professionals must advise clients to exercise utmost care in observing deadlines and documenting their efforts to comply, as the courts will critically examine both prongs of the equitable tolling test.

Prepared with assistance from NotebookLM.