Rouzard v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 209 (2025), aff’d, No. 2026-1233 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2026) (per curiam)

Introduction and Statutory Overview

For tax practitioners representing clients in federal tax controversies, the procedural prerequisites for maintaining a tax refund suit against the sovereign are unforgiving. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States may not be sued without its consent, and the terms of that consent define a court’s authority to entertain the action. In refund litigation, this principle is codified primarily in Section 7422(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the United States Code). Section 7422(a) mandates that:

“No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.”

The phrase “duly filed” carries significant substantive weight. While practitioners often view refund procedures through the lens of jurisdictional timeliness under I.R.C. § 6511, recent jurisprudence from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has reinforced a critical distinction: the physical filing of an administrative claim addresses jurisdiction, but the adequacy of that claim—specifically its factual specificity and documentary substantiation—governs whether the taxpayer has stated a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

The decision of the Court of Federal Claims in Rouzard v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 209 (2025), and its subsequent affirmance by the Federal Circuit (Rouzard v. United States, No. 2026-1233 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2026)), provide a textbook study of these principles. The litigation demonstrates the fatal consequences of asserting unsupported overpayment and withholding claims—particularly those premised on fringe or tax-protestor theories—and clarifies how the trial and appellate courts evaluate administrative adequacy, substantiation, and motion-to-dismiss standards in federal tax refund actions.

Underlying Facts and Tax Filings

The plaintiff, Diansky Rouzard, proceeding pro se, initiated refund litigation involving two distinct tax years: 2019 and 2022.

The 2019 Tax Return

On February 22, 2023, Rouzard filed a delinquent Form 1040 for the 2019 tax year in the name of the “DIANSKY ROUZARD ESTATE,” designating his occupation as “Executor.” The return reported $30,046 in gross wages and taxable income of $17,846 after subtracting the applicable standard deduction of $12,200. After applying a child tax credit for two children, Rouzard reported a net income tax liability of zero ($0).

However, on the payments section of Form 1040, Rouzard reported $30,046 in “2019 estimated tax payments and amount applied from 2018 return”—an amount exactly matching his total reported gross income for the year. Because his self-assessed tax liability was zero, Rouzard claimed an overpayment of $30,046 and sought an immediate refund in that amount.

Rouzard included no documentation, withholding statements, or payment receipts substantiating that he or the purported estate had ever remitted $30,046 (or any other amount) to the Treasury. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) examined its records and found no record of any estimated tax payments or credit elect carryforwards. Consequently, the IRS issued a CP13 Notice informing Rouzard that the claimed $30,046 payment was an error, adjusting the payments and credits to zero, and reducing the account balance to zero. Although the notice invited Rouzard to submit substantiating documentation by January 12, 2024, if he disagreed, he failed to submit any corroborating records.

The 2022 Original and Amended Returns

For the 2022 tax year, Rouzard initially filed an electronic Form 1040 in February 2023 reporting total income of $4,376 ($4,373 in wages supported by four Form W-2s, plus $3 of taxable interest). He designated his occupation as “unemployed.” Applying the 2022 standard deduction of $12,950, his taxable income and resulting tax liability were zero. The return reported tax payments totaling $713, consisting of $378 in income tax withholding and $335 from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), requesting a $713 refund. The IRS processed and accepted the original 2022 return as filed, but pursuant to its statutory offset authority under I.R.C. § 6402(a), applied the entire $713 overpayment to an outstanding tax deficiency Rouzard owed for the 2021 tax year.

Subsequently, on June 5, 2023, the IRS received a Form 1040-X from Rouzard dated May 26, 2023, amending his 2022 return. On this amended return, Rouzard altered his filing posture radically:

He reported total income of $49,094, classifying the entire sum under “other income” and describing it as “Redeem in Lawful Money per Title 12 U.S.C. § 411.”
He listed his occupation as “bene” (beneficiary).
Applying the standard deduction of $12,950, he reported taxable income of $36,144 and calculated a tax liability of $4,130.
On the payments line, he reported federal income tax withholding of $49,094, attributing it to “[f]ederal income tax withheld from Form(s) 1099.”
Subtracting the calculated tax of $4,130 from the purported withholding of $49,094, Rouzard claimed an overpayment and requested a refund of $44,964.

To support this purported withholding, Rouzard submitted a Form 1099-A (“Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property”). The form reflected that Rouzard was a lender to a commercial mortgage company with an outstanding principal balance of $49,094. The Form 1099-A did not report any federal income tax withholding whatsoever. Furthermore, IRS transcript records contained no record of any third-party Form 1099 filed on Rouzard’s behalf, nor any remittance of taxes. Accordingly, the IRS declined to issue the claimed refund.

Taxpayer’s Complaint and Claims for Relief

On December 20, 2024, Rouzard filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, followed by an amended complaint on January 2, 2025. Rouzard asserted three primary counts:

Tax Refund Claims: An action under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) seeking recovery of $75,010 in tax refunds ($30,046 for 2019 and $44,964 for 2022).
Tort and Fiduciary Claims: Claims alleging that the IRS engaged in “administrative negligence” and violated “fiduciary obligations,” inflicting financial injury, lost opportunities, reputational harm, and emotional distress.
Constitutional Takings / Due Process: A claim alleging that the IRS’s failure to promptly process his returns and issue refunds constituted a deprivation of property without due process under the Fifth Amendment.

In his prayer for relief, Rouzard demanded $75,010 for the refund claims, alongside an astounding $274,315,010 in compensatory damages, civil penalties, and exemplary damages, totaling $274,390,020.

On June 18, 2025, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Rouzard’s non-refund claims seeking compensatory and tort damages for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Tucker Act specifically excludes cases sounding in tort and that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is not money-mandating (Rouzard v. United States, No. 24-2111, 2025 WL 2366443 (Fed. Cl. June 18, 2025)). This left only the statutory tax refund claims totaling $75,010.

Procedural Skirmish Over Timeliness of Dispositive Motion

A procedural issue arose when the government filed its motion to dismiss the remaining refund claims. The court had established an extended deadline of October 6, 2025, for the government’s dispositive motion. Due to the unforeseen illness of government counsel, new Department of Justice counsel substituted into the matter and moved for leave to file out of time on October 7. The court granted leave, and the government filed its motion to dismiss on October 8, 2025.

Rouzard vigorously objected, moving for reconsideration and arguing that the government’s motion should be stricken as procedurally defective. The Court of Federal Claims rejected this challenge, observing that under Rule 12(h)(2) and Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), defenses based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim may be raised at any time.

The Trial Court’s Legal Analysis and Application to the Facts

The government moved for dismissal under both RCFC 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and RCFC 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). In a comprehensive opinion authored by Judge Richard A. Hertling, the Court of Federal Claims analyzed the dual requirements of jurisdiction and pleading sufficiency in tax refund litigation.

The Jurisdictional Gate vs. Merits Sufficiency

The court first addressed its jurisdictional charter. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the Court of Federal Claims possesses jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States founded upon the Constitution, an Act of Congress, or executive regulations. Section 1346(a)(1) of Title 28 specifically grants concurrent jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims and federal district courts over:

“Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected . . . .”

However, Section 1346(a)(1) must be read in tandem with I.R.C. § 7422(a), which establishes that no suit shall be maintained until a refund claim has been “duly filed” with the Secretary. Relying on controlling Federal Circuit authority in Dixon v. United States, 67 F.4th 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2023), and Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2022), Judge Hertling underscored the precise demarcation between jurisdiction and merits:

“The requirement that an administrative claim be filed goes to jurisdiction; the adequacy of an administrative filing to support a claim goes to whether a claim is meritorious.”

Because Rouzard had in fact submitted Forms 1040 and 1040-X to the IRS, the administrative filing requirement per se did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Rather, the pivotal inquiry was whether those filings met the statutory and regulatory criteria to be considered “duly filed,” an issue properly adjudicated under RCFC 12(b)(6).

The Specificity Doctrine Under Treasury Regulation § 301.6402-2(b)(1)

To determine whether an administrative claim has been “duly filed,” the court examined Treasury Regulation § 301.6402-2(b)(1), which establishes:

“The claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof. The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a written declaration that it is made under penalties of perjury. A claim which does not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund . . . .”

As established in Waltner v. United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012), compliance with this specificity requirement necessitates that a claimant provide the IRS with all essential documentation—such as Form W-2s and Form 1099s—to enable the Commissioner to verify and resolve the claim. The Waltner court affirmed that the specificity rule serves the vital administrative purpose of preventing frivolous claims and allowing the IRS to investigate within its own administrative machinery before facing suit.

Judge Hertling invoked the Court of Federal Claims’ recent decision in Leopard v. United States, 2025 WL 2803052 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 2, 2025), emphasizing that:

“‘[U]nsupported assertions or tax-protestor arguments do not satisfy the administrative requirements necessary to state a claim’ for a tax refund.”

Scrutiny of the Tax Filings and Proffered Exhibits

Applying these standards, the court evaluated the factual allegations and the five categories of exhibits Rouzard submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss:

The 2019 Claim: For 2019, Rouzard claimed an overpayment of $30,046 on the line for estimated tax payments and prior-year credit carryforwards. Yet, as Judge Hertling observed, Rouzard “did not include any documentation reflecting any payment of taxes entitling the plaintiff to a refund, and the IRS has no record of any payment from the plaintiff. The plaintiff merely identified $30,046 as an ‘overpayment’ and requested, without any evidence, a refund.” Merely populating a line on a tax form with an arbitrary dollar figure does not constitute facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the basis of the claim.
The 2022 Claim and 12 U.S.C. § 411: The amended 2022 return sought $44,964 based on $49,094 in alleged withholding. The court characterized the claim as “frivolous on its face.” Rouzard attributed his income to “redeem in lawful money per Title 12 U.S.C. § 411.” Section 411 of Title 12 governs the issuance and redemption of Federal Reserve notes to Federal Reserve banks, an institutional banking statute that confers no private tax exemption or monetization mechanism upon individual citizens.
Form 1099-A as Purported Withholding: Rouzard attempted to support the $49,094 withholding by attaching a Form 1099-A. The court rejected this device entirely:

“Indeed, the Form 1099-A is implausible on its face, as it reflects that the plaintiff, who is unemployed, is lending funds to a mortgage lender. Further, the claim does not explain the source of the income. . . . Self-prepared 1099-A forms reflecting a purported ‘Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property’ are not proof that such sums were withheld from the plaintiff and remitted to the IRS, or that the plaintiff himself paid that sum to the IRS.”
The Five Opposition Exhibits: Rouzard argued that his compliance report, account transcripts, IRS portal screenshot, CP13 notice, and 1099-A forms established that his claims were duly filed. The court held that these records demonstrated at most that the IRS received and processed forms, but confirmed zero payments and directly contradicted his claims:

“Providing documentation that confirms refund claims were filed with the IRS is not sufficient to show that the plaintiff provided the IRS with documentation necessary to allow the IRS to adjudicate his claims.”

Concluding that Rouzard failed to plead plausible facts showing that he duly filed administrative refund claims complying with 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1), the Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s motion under RCFC 12(b)(6) and dismissed the complaint.

Appellate Review by the Federal Circuit

Rouzard appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Appeal No. 2026-1233). In a per curiam opinion issued on November 10, 2026, by a panel comprising Circuit Judges Prost, Taranto, and Stark, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal in all respects.

Standard of Review and Procedural Rulings

The Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, citing Dixon, 67 F.4th at 1165 (“Where jurisdiction was not determined based on resolution of factual disputes, we decide de novo the correctness of a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim”).

On the procedural issue regarding the government’s out-of-time motion, the panel reviewed the Claims Court’s docket-management decisions for abuse of discretion under Nuance Communications, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Citing the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936), and Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 848–49 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the court affirmed that trial courts possess inherent authority to manage their dockets. Because the two-day extension was necessitated by unforeseen counsel illness, Rouzard suffered no prejudice, and Rouzard had himself been afforded similar extensions, no abuse of discretion occurred.

Substantive Affirmance on the “Duly Filed” Requirement

Turning to the merits of the RCFC 12(b)(6) dismissal, the Federal Circuit reinforced its holding in Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th at 1011–12, that while the “duly filed” requirement of I.R.C. § 7422(a) does not control subject-matter jurisdiction, it is a non-waivable statutory requirement governing the legal sufficiency of the claim:

“Failure to plead enough to meet the requirement if taken as true warrants dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”

Citing its foundational decision in Waltner, the appellate court reaffirmed that Treasury Regulation § 301.6402-2(b)(1) imposes a strict specificity mandate:

“A return ‘must contain sufficient data to allow calculation of tax’ and evince ‘an honest and reasonable intent to supply information [that is] required by the tax code’ and that ‘rise[s] to the level of specificity required by regulation.’”

Reviewing the record, the Federal Circuit agreed that Rouzard’s submissions were legally defective:

The October 9, 2025 compliance report merely confirmed timely receipt of the return, offering no factual basis for refund entitlement.
The 2019 Record of Account simply echoed Rouzard’s self-serving return entries and “identifies no transactions corroborating Mr. Rouzard’s claimed $30,046 tax payment.”
The CP13 Notice did not show agency verification of overpayment, but expressly demonstrated the opposite: that the IRS corrected the claimed payment to zero because it had never been received.
The Form 1099-A filings bore no evidence of IRS receipt, failed to substantiate any tax remittance, and contained cryptic notations such as “Credits used on Student Loan” and “Credits used on [redacted].”

The Federal Circuit emphasized that:

“The plausibility line that must be crossed to avoid FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal is not crossed by this record for the important specificity requirement of ‘duly filed’ claims that inform the agency of the basis for a refund.”

Disposal of Taxpayer’s “Constructive Disallowance” and “Variance” Arguments

On appeal, Rouzard attempted to circumvent dismissal by raising two sophisticated procedural doctrines: constructive disallowance and the substantial variance doctrine. The Federal Circuit firmly dismissed both arguments as fundamentally misplaced:

Constructive Disallowance: Rouzard argued that the IRS’s failure to act on his refund requests constituted a “constructive disallowance” that triggered his statutory right to bring suit under I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). The Federal Circuit held this doctrine inapposite:

“As to his ‘constructive disallowance’ argument, the conclusion of the Claims Court is not that Mr. Rouzard lacked the statutory right to sue (and thus that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction), but rather that Mr. Rouzard’s filings were, as a substantive matter, inadequate to show plausible entitlement to relief—even taking all well-pleaded facts as true.”
Variance Doctrine: Rouzard asserted that the “variance doctrine”—which prohibits a taxpayer from asserting legal or factual grounds in court that were not fairly presented in the administrative refund claim—was improperly applied to bar his suit. The Federal Circuit noted that the trial court had never invoked the variance doctrine against him; rather, his complaint failed because he never alleged plausible, substantiated facts proving that any overpayment or withholding occurred in the first instance.

Practical Implications and Practice Pointers for Tax Professionals

The rulings in Rouzard carry vital operational takeaways for CPAs, Enrolled Agents, and tax litigators managing administrative refund claims and refund litigation:

Distinguishing Jurisdictional Filing from Pleading Adequacy

Under the Federal Circuit’s Brown and Dixon framework, submitting a tax return or Form 1040-X physically satisfies the jurisdictional condition precedent of presenting a claim to the agency under I.R.C. § 7422(a). However, overcoming a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss requires compliance with the administrative specificity rules of Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). A bare tax return containing unsubstantiated payment or withholding entries does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Strict Rejection of Form 1099-A / “Lawful Money” Schemes

Practitioners occasionally encounter prospective clients who have fallen prey to internet-driven tax myths asserting that personal debts can be monetized, that Form 1099-A represents tax withholding, or that referencing 12 U.S.C. § 411 creates nontaxable “lawful money.” Both the Claims Court and Federal Circuit treated these theories as frivolous on their face. Assisting or signing returns with such positions exposes practitioners to severe civil penalties under I.R.C. § 6694 (preparer penalties) and I.R.C. § 6702 (frivolous tax submissions), as well as disciplinary proceedings under Treasury Circular 230.

Substantiating Payments and Withholdings Is an Administrative Prerequisite

In administrative practice, refund claims grounded in excess withholding or estimated tax payments must be corroborated by objective third-party proof:

For wage withholding: valid Form W-2s matching IRS Information Returns Processing (IRP) transcripts.
For non-wage withholding: valid Form 1099s reflecting actual tax withheld in Box 4.
For estimated payments: cancelled checks, bank statements, or official IRS payment confirmation numbers tying directly to Master File transaction codes (e.g., TC 660, TC 710).

Failing to attach this verification to the administrative claim risks having the submission deemed a legal nullity that fails to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis of the claim.

Transcripts Show Receipt, Not Substantiation

A common practitioner misstep is relying on an IRS Record of Account or transcript reflecting receipt of an amended return (e.g., TC 976 / TC 977) as proof that the claim is substantively viable. As Rouzard demonstrates, agency processing records prove only that a piece of paper was delivered; they do not substantiate entitlement to the refund or satisfy the regulatory specificity requirements.

Prepared with assistance from Gemini Notebook.