Maniktala v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 25-1366 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2026)

For decades, tax practitioners have operated under the strict assumption that the ninety-day filing deadline to petition the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of a deficiency under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6213(a) is an absolute, non-negotiable jurisdictional bar. Under this traditional paradigm, a late-filed petition, even by a single day, stripped the Tax Court of its power and left the taxpayer with no recourse but to pay the tax and sue for a refund in Federal District Court or the Court of Federal Claims. However, in Maniktala v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 25-1366 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dramatically upended this orthodoxy. Following recent landmark Supreme Court decisions disciplining the term “jurisdictional,” the Eighth Circuit held that the filing deadline under Section 6213(a) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule subject to equitable tolling. This decision aligns the Eighth Circuit with a growing multi-circuit consensus and marks a critical milestone in administrative tax equity.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The appellants, Nate and Jaya Maniktala, filed joint federal income tax returns for the 2018 and 2019 tax years. Nate Maniktala was a shareholder in BranchPattern, Inc. (BPI), an S-corporation specializing in building design. On their joint returns, the Maniktalas claimed S-corporation flow-through tax credits under 26 U.S.C. § 41, which were based on BPI’s research and development activities during those tax years. Following an examination, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that BPI did not qualify for the claimed research credits and subsequently issued a statutory notice of deficiency to BPI’s shareholders, including the Maniktalas, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6212.

On December 20, 2023, the Commissioner mailed the notice of deficiency to the Maniktalas via certified mail. In compliance with 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a), the notice explicitly listed March 19, 2024, as the “[l]ast day to file petition with US tax court.” Crucially, however, due to severe and unexplained transit delays, the Maniktalas did not actually receive the notice of deficiency until July 9, 2024—nearly four months after the designated March deadline had already elapsed.

Faced with a deficiency notice that arrived long after its face-value expiration, the Maniktalas acted quickly. Just ten days later, on July 19, 2024, they filed a petition for redetermination in the United States Tax Court. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that because the petition was filed four months after the ninety-day statutory window, the Tax Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Consistent with long-standing precedent, the Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Maniktalas appealed the dismissal to the Eighth Circuit, raising a singular, highly technical legal challenge: is the ninety-day filing deadline in Section 6213(a) a jurisdictional requirement, or is it a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule that can be equitably tolled?

Standard of Review and the Departure from Stare Decisis

The Court of Appeals reviewed the Tax Court’s jurisdictional dismissal de novo, noting that “the issue presented is whether the deadline they missed is a jurisdictional requirement which, if not met, deprives the Tax Court of authority to resolve the petition.” (Bartman v. Comm’r, 446 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2006)).

Before addressing the statutory merits, the Eighth Circuit had to clear a significant procedural hurdle: its own prior precedent. In Andrews v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), an earlier panel of the Eighth Circuit had unequivocally stated that “[t]he law is clear that the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction over an untimely petition” filed under Section 6213(a). Under the circuit’s “cardinal rule,” a panel is generally bound by the decisions of a prior panel (Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011)).

However, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the prior panel rule is “not absolute.” (United States v. Donath, 107 F.4th 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2024)). A panel may depart from circuit precedent if there is an intervening Supreme Court decision that is inconsistent with or undermines that precedent (Jones v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 2017)). The court observed that the Andrews opinion “includes no analysis of the jurisdictional issue presented here.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently cautioned that courts “have more than occasionally misused the term ‘jurisdictional’ to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions,” and that “describ[ing] something ‘without elaboration’ as jurisdictional [] does not end the inquiry.” (Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 159–60 (2023)). Consequently, the Eighth Circuit held that recent Supreme Court decisions in the jurisdictional arena undermined Andrews, paving the way for a fresh, independent statutory analysis.

The Supreme Court’s Modern Jurisdictional Framework

The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is heavily anchored in the Supreme Court’s ongoing effort to “bring some discipline to the use of [the] term” “jurisdictional.” (Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)). Under modern jurisprudence:

Jurisdictional Rules: “pertain to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.” (MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 297 (2023), quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010)).
Nonjurisdictional Procedural Requirements: merely seek to “promote the orderly progress of litigation” by “instruct[ing] ‘parties [to] take certain procedural steps at certain specified times’ without conditioning a court’s authority to hear the case on compliance with those steps.” (Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022), citing Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435).

Branding a rule as jurisdictional has “considerable practical importance for judges and litigants,” because jurisdictional defects cannot be waived, must be raised sua sponte by courts, and are not subject to equitable tolling. To prevent harsh and inequitable results, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court’s power only if Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ as much.” (United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 409 (2015)).

While this “clear statement rule” does not require “magic words,” the “traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” (Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410). The Supreme Court has set an exceptionally high bar for such statements: “the statement must indeed be clear; it is insufficient that a jurisdictional reading is ‘plausible,’ or even ‘better,’ than nonjurisdictional alternatives.” (MOAC Mall Holdings, 598 U.S. at 298, quoting Boechler, 596 U.S. at 206).

Textual Analysis of Section 6213(a) and the “Clear Tie” Standard

Applying these tools of statutory construction, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the text of Section 6213(a) “does not ‘clearly mandate [a] jurisdictional reading.’” (Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204). The filing deadline itself is directed solely to the taxpayer:

“Within 90 days . . . the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.” (26 U.S.C. § 6213(a)).

As established in Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 485 (2024), “what matters” in determining whether a filing deadline is jurisdictional “is whether a time bar speaks to a court’s authority to hear a case.” (quoting Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 411). Section 6213(a)’s timing clause “explains what the taxpayer may do” rather than restricting the court’s core power.

The only explicit mention of “jurisdiction” in Section 6213(a) appears later in the subsection, directed specifically at the Tax Court’s power to issue injunctions and order refunds:

“The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such petition.” (26 U.S.C. § 6213(a)).

The Eighth Circuit reasoned that this specific layout demonstrates “Congress knew how to limit the scope of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction,” restricting its ancillary powers to issue injunctions or refunds, but leaving its core authority to review an untimely petition untouched. Citing Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2023), the court highlighted that “a requirement ‘does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions.’” (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 155 (2013)).

Crucially, the Eighth Circuit drew a direct parallel to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Boechler. There, the Supreme Court examined 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1), which provides: “The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” Despite the direct linguistic proximity between the 30-day deadline and the parenthetical jurisdictional grant, the Supreme Court found the deadline nonjurisdictional because there was no “clear tie” between the two. The Eighth Circuit concluded that a “clear tie” is similarly missing in Section 6213(a), stating that “the jurisdictional limitation and the filing deadline have even less textual connection than the grant and deadline in Boechler.”

Evaluating the Commissioner’s Counterarguments and Section 7459(d) Finality

To defend its jurisdictional reading, the Commissioner raised a highly technical policy argument centered around 26 U.S.C. § 7459(d). This section governs the effects of Tax Court dismissals:

“If a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Tax Court dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Secretary. An order specifying such amount shall be entered in the records of the Tax Court unless . . . the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction.” (26 U.S.C. § 7459(d)).

The Commissioner contended that if the Section 6213(a) deadline is interpreted as nonjurisdictional, a taxpayer who files a late petition which is subsequently dismissed by the Tax Court will, “ironically,” be in a far worse position. Because the dismissal would not be “for lack of jurisdiction,” it would trigger the statutory default under Section 7459(d), constituting a decision on the merits that the deficiency is correct. Under res judicata, this finality would completely foreclose the taxpayer from paying the tax and pursuing a refund suit in federal district court—an alternative avenue that remains open if the dismissal is jurisdictional.

The Eighth Circuit, however, was unimpressed by this “harsh consequence” argument. Adopting the reasoning of the Second and Third Circuits, the court noted that:

“[T]his situation presents itself only if a taxpayer files a late petition for redetermination of a deficiency, the Tax Court dismisses his or her petition, the taxpayer then pays the disputed deficiency, files for a refund, gets denied, and then sues in federal court challenging the denial.” (Culp, 75 F.4th at 202; Buller v. Comm’r, 160 F.4th 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2025)).

The court concluded that “a perhaps-unanticipated impact on a limited number of taxpayers” does not provide the “sufficiently ‘clear’ indication” required to conclude that Congress wanted the rule to be jurisdictional (citing Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436).

Furthermore, the Commissioner asserted that Section 6213(a) contains an implicit grant of the Tax Court’s “deficiency jurisdiction” and must be interpreted as jurisdictional when viewed in the context of the overall tax collection system. While acknowledging these specialized tax policy arguments, the court reemphasized the strictness of the clear statement rule: “the Commissioner’s interpretation must be not only better [than the taxpayers’], but also clear.” (Boechler, 596 U.S. at 206). Because the Commissioner’s historical reading failed to meet this high standard, the court officially declared: “Filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules. Today we hold the filing deadline in § 6213(a) is no exception.”

The Rebuttable Presumption of Equitable Tolling

Once a filing deadline is determined to be nonjurisdictional, a rebuttable presumption arises that the period is subject to equitable tolling (Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). To rebut this presumption, the Commissioner must show “an affirmative indication . . . that [Congress] intends to preclude equitable tolling.” (Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 420; Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Mich., 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2026)).

The Eighth Circuit found absolutely nothing in the text of Section 6213(a) to rebut this presumption. Specifically:

Section 6213(a) “does not expressly prohibit equitable tolling.”
The “time limit is directed at the taxpayer, not the court.”
The deadline is not drafted in a highly detailed, highly technical manner, nor is it accompanied by an explicit, enumerated list of exceptions.

The court distinguished Section 6213(a) from the strict refund limitations under 26 U.S.C. § 6511 discussed in United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350–52 (1997). Section 6511 “sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that, linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions” and “reiterates its limitations several times in several different ways,” which successfully rebuts the equitable tolling presumption. By contrast, Section 6213(a) lacks any such complex structural limitations. Thus, the court concluded that the Section 6213(a) ninety-day filing window is subject to equitable tolling.

The Changing Circuit Landscape and Tax Court Remand

The decision of whether to equitably toll a limitations period is “not automatically applicable” and must be evaluated “on a case-by-case basis.” (Oquendo v. Comm’r, 148 F.4th 820, 833 (6th Cir. 2025); Boechler, 596 U.S. at 211). Because the Tax Court dismissed the case strictly on jurisdictional grounds, it had never evaluated the factual merits of the Maniktalas’ equitable tolling claim. The Eighth Circuit therefore reversed the Tax Court’s dismissal and remanded the case to allow the Tax Court to determine “in the first instance whether the Maniktalas have met their burden to warrant equitable tolling.”

By holding Section 6213(a) nonjurisdictional, the Eighth Circuit joined a rapidly expanding group of circuit courts that have abandoned the traditional jurisdictional view in the wake of Boechler. Specifically, the Second Circuit (Buller), Third Circuit (Culp), and Sixth Circuit (Oquendo) have all held that the deficiency petition deadline is nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling.

Conversely, only the Seventh Circuit (Tilden v. Comm’r, 846 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2017)) and the Ninth Circuit (Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2020)) have held Section 6213(a) to be strictly jurisdictional. However, as the Sixth Circuit noted in Oquendo, these older decisions “are better viewed as vestiges of a bygone era” because the Supreme Court’s mandate to “bring some discipline” to the term “jurisdictional” effectively strip them of their persuasive weight.

Key Technical Takeaways for Tax Professionals

For CPAs and Enrolled Agents, Maniktala v. Commissioner represents a profound shift in deficiency procedure within the Eighth Circuit, with several practical implications:

The “Mailbox Rule” is No Longer the Only Shield: Historically, practitioners relied exclusively on the timely mailing rules under 26 U.S.C. § 7502. If a taxpayer missed the ninety-day window (or the 150-day window for taxpayers outside the U.S.), the case was dead in the Tax Court. Now, if a taxpayer faces extraordinary circumstances—such as the extreme mail delivery delay of over six months experienced by the Maniktalas—equitable tolling is a viable defense.
The Burden of Proof Remains High: Although equitable tolling is now legally available in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, it is “not automatically applicable.” Taxpayers bear a heavy burden to establish that they acted with reasonable diligence and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in their way. In Maniktala, the taxpayers filed their petition within ten days of actual receipt, which strongly supports their claim of reasonable diligence on remand.
Geographical Split Dictates Strategy: Because the Seventh and Ninth Circuits currently maintain that the deadline is jurisdictional, practitioners representing taxpayers in those geographic areas must remain extremely conservative. In those jurisdictions, missing the deadline still results in a fatal jurisdictional dismissal. In contrast, practitioners in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits now have a powerful tool to salvage untimely petitions where equitable grounds exist.

Maniktala is a triumph of common sense and equity over rigid formalism, ensuring that taxpayers who are deprived of timely notice are no longer locked out of the Tax Court’s doors.

Prepared with assistance from Gemini Notebook.