An issue that has been a recurrent subject for discussion among tax professionals is the applicability of the timely mailing rule outlined in IRC §7502. Specifically, the case we will look at it addresses the consequences when a taxpayer submits a document without utilizing certified mail, registered mail, or an approved private delivery service. Although this scenario typically arises when a taxpayer asserts having mailed their return on the final day for filing, the present case entails the taxpayer’s assertion that the document in question was mailed three months prior to the document’s deadline for submission.

Proof of Timely Filing

IRC §7502 was enacted with the purpose of offering taxpayers a sense of assurance and certainty when utilizing the U.S. Postal Service to file their tax returns and other essential tax documents. It establishes specific methods that enable taxpayers to ensure that their documents have been filed within the designated time frame.

The general rule is found at IRC §7502(a)(1) and reads:

(a) General rule.

(1) Date of delivery. If any return, claim, statement, or other document required to be filed, or any payment required to be made, within a prescribed period or on or before a prescribed date under authority of any provision of the internal revenue laws is, after such period or such date, delivered by United States mail to the agency, officer, or office with which such return, claim, statement, or other document is required to be filed, or to which such payment is required to be made, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in which such return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery or the date of payment, as the case may be.

While the timely mailing rule under IRC §7502 does offer a level of protection to taxpayers who choose to file using standard first-class mail, it is important to note its significant limitations. Firstly, the rule applies solely if the return is effectively delivered to the IRS, and the taxpayer is able to substantiate such delivery, typically by having the IRS locate the filed return. Secondly, it necessitates a postmark bearing a date no later than the final deadline for filing the document.

For taxpayers seeking both documentation of the postmark date and the presumption of actual delivery, IRC §7502(c) provides a viable solution. The statute outlines one option explicitly (registered mail) and presents two additional options that the IRS has the authority to implement through regulations (certified mail and the use of electronic filing). The IRS has issued comprehensive regulations outlining the specific requirements and procedures to qualify for the protection afforded by each of these methods.

IRC §7502(c) provides:

(c) Registered and certain mailing; electronic filing.

(1) Registered mail. For purposes of this section, if any return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is sent by United States registered mail--

(A) such registration shall be prima facie evidence that the return, claim, statement, or other document was delivered to the agency, officer, or office to which addressed; and

(B) the date of registration shall be deemed the postmark date.

(2) Certified mail; electronic filing. The Secretary is authorized to provide by regulations the extent to which the provisions of paragraph (1) with respect to prima facie evidence of delivery and the postmark date shall apply to certified mail and electronic filing.

Additionally, IRC §7502(f) introduced an alternative option (for which the IRS has developed regulations) that allows taxpayers to utilize an approved private delivery service.

Before delving further into the specifics of the current case, it is crucial to acknowledge a vital practical consideration. Had the taxpayer availed themselves of the methods stipulated in IRC §7502(c) or (f), along with the corresponding regulations, the matter would have been resolved in favor of the taxpayer. In light of this, tax advisers should strongly emphasize and encourage clients to adopt these measures as a best practice.

Facts of this Case

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently weighed in on this matter through the case of Pond v. United States.[1] The case revolves around an incident where the IRS made an error, leading to a taxpayer paying the requested tax amount. Subsequently, the taxpayer's CPA received the IRS's explanation of the tax obligation and accurately determined that the tax in question (which had already been paid by the taxpayer) was not actually owed.

The Court summarized the issue as follows:

The IRS audited Pond’s business and revealed an alleged overpayment. But the IRS misinterpreted its own audit, concluding that Pond had underpaid. So the IRS told Pond that he owed more taxes. He paid up, including interest. Only later did Pond’s accountant discover the IRS’s mistake. Properly understood, the audit revealed that Pond had overpaid.[2]

Consequently, the taxpayer pursued a course of action to reclaim the amount rightfully owed to them.

Pond thus requested a refund (1) on his 2012 taxes, (2) on his 2013 taxes, and (3) of the interest he had paid on the 2012 back payments. To request the refund on the taxes for both years, Pond says that he sent separate forms in a single envelope via first-class mail to an IRS center in Holtsville, New York in July 2017. Around the same time, to request the refund of the interest, Pond sent a form to an IRS center in Covington, Kentucky, which forwarded the request to an IRS center in Andover, Massachusetts.[3]

The opinion notes that Mr. Pond eventually received a refund of 2012 taxes but no refund of 2013 taxes:

What followed was a series of communications with the IRS that resulted in Pond getting a refund on his 2012 taxes and of the interest he paid, but not on his 2013 taxes.[4]

The Court then outlined the next developments:

Pond first heard back from IRS Andover in September about his interest-refund request: They had received his request but wanted a copy of his refund claim for the 2012 taxes to confirm that he was entitled to the interest refund. Pond responded on October 3 that he had sent his original request for a tax refund to IRS Holtsville. But to be helpful — and “out of an abundance of caution” — he forwarded a duplicate copy of his 2012 tax-refund request to IRS Andover. J.A. 9. Three weeks later, on October 26, 2017, the statutory period to claim a refund ended.

After another few weeks, Pond heard from IRS Andover again. They claimed to have shared Pond's 2012 tax-refund claim with IRS Holtsville and that someone from Holtsville would contact Pond about his claim. Several months passed and Pond heard nothing. Then, in March 2018 — without further contact from IRS Holtsville — Pond received a refund for the 2012 tax year, including interest.[5]

But 2013 proved to be more of a problem for Mr. Pond:

Sometime later, having heard nothing about his 2013 claim, he again contacted the IRS about it. At that time, agents at the IRS “attempting to locate the 2013 Form 1040X were unable to find it anywhere on the IRS’s system.” J.A. 10. So Pond sent a duplicate copy of his 2013 claim to IRS Holtsville. Time passed. Again, Pond heard nothing. So Pond contacted IRS Holtsville and learned that his claim had been “processed . . . and assigned to an agent.” J.A. 10. They “promised” Pond would hear something from the agent. J.A. 10.

More months went by, and Pond still heard nothing. When he once again contacted IRS Holtsville, Pond learned that his 2013 claim had been closed with no refund issued. Although the claim had been closed, the agent at IRS Holtsville could not locate a copy of the claim on the IRS’s system, so Pond faxed a third copy directly to the agent.

A couple of weeks later, Pond received a Notice of Denial informing him that his 2013 refund claim was denied because the statute of limitations had run. The denial letter listed the “[d]ate of claims received” as July 17, 2017. J.A. 84.[6]

This date of claims received would eventually become an issue in the Court’s decision. But now the taxpayer faced an IRS holding that this claim had been filed too late, which meant the IRS was not going to issue him a refund.

So now the taxpayer attempted to get this determination reversed:

Pond filed a formal protest of the denial with IRS Holtsville. He got no response, so he contacted the office and learned that his protest had not been processed. So he tried to go to the higher-ups. He filed a protest with the IRS's Office of Appeals. But the Office of Appeals returned his protest and told Pond that he did not “have a case pending in the Office of Appeals,” effectively sending him back to IRS Holtsville. J.A. 12.

Having had enough, Pond filed an action in federal court for a tax refund. The government moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing they were entitled to sovereign immunity because the refund claim was not timely filed.[7]

Taxpayer’s First Option for Timely Filing – Attempting to Use the Common Law Mailbox Rule

The Court now summarizes the deadlines that applied in this case for the 2013 refund:

During the relevant period, a refund claim was timely if filed “within 6 months after the day on which the Secretary mails the notice of computational adjustment to the partner.” See 26 U.S.C. §6230(c)(2)(A) (2016). The IRS sent Pond a Notice of Computation Adjustment on April 26, 2017. He was therefore required to file his claim by October 26, 2017, to benefit from the sovereign-immunity waiver. Pond says that he complied with this requirement, and that he sent his refund claim via first-class mail postmarked July 18, 2017. But the IRS says that they have no record of that claim. So Pond must — at this stage — either show that he (1) can rely on a presumption of delivery or (2) plausibly alleged physical delivery.[8]

The taxpayer first claims that he should be able to use the common law mailbox rule to establish timely filing of his claim. The Court summarizes the rule as follows:

…[W]hen courts refer to the “mailbox rule,” they are often talking about one of two distinct — but related — presumptions. The narrower presumption is merely of timeliness, not delivery. In other words, if a filer can show that the document was actually delivered, but can’t pinpoint precisely when that happened, then this narrower version of the mailbox rule would allow a court to presume that “physical delivery occurred in the ordinary time after mailing.” Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension Fund v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2008); see also id. (“[T]he mailbox rule is merely a method for determining the date of physical delivery under the ‘physical delivery’ rule. It does not ignore the physical delivery requirement.”); Me. Med. Center v. United States, 675 F.3d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 2012).

The broader presumption is of physical delivery. Courts adopting this version of the mailbox rule say that “proof of proper mailing — including by testimonial or circumstantial evidence — gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the document was physically delivered to the addressee in the time such a mailing would ordinarily take to arrive.” Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 840; see also Detroit Auto. Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 203 F.2d 785, 785 (6th Cir. 1953) (“[W]hen mail matter is properly addressed and deposited in the United States mails, with postage thereon duly prepared, there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail.”).[9]

A crucial question arises regarding the continued applicability of this common law principle in light of the enactment of IRC §7502. The Court acknowledges this matter and highlights the absence of consensus among other Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the correct interpretation and resolution of the issue:

May a taxpayer invoke the preexisting common-law mailbox rule now that Congress enacted the new statutory mailbox rule in §7502? The answer depends on whether the statute merely supplements the common-law mailbox rule or else supplants it altogether. And the courts of appeals have split on the question. The Second and Sixth Circuits both say that the statute supplanted the common-law rule. See Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d 728, 731 (6th Cir. 1986); Deutsch v. Comm’r, 599 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979). The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, however, both say the statute merely supplemented the common-law rule. See Sorrentino v. IRS, 383 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2004); Est. of Wood v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d 1155, 1160–61 (8th Cir. 1990).[10]

The Fourth Circuit panel announces that, in its view, IRC §7502 completely replaces, rather than supplements, the common-law mailbox rule concerning the matters encompassed by IRC §7502:

We agree with the Second and Sixth Circuits that the statute has supplanted the common-law rule.[11]

The panel outlines the concepts it deems appropriate to apply in making this determination:

When a federal statute invades an area occupied by federal common law, we generally presume the statute does not change the established common law. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). This presumption favors “the retention of long-established and familiar principles.” Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). But the presumption in favor of background principles may be overcome — and the common law supplanted — when “the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.” Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812); see also Texas, 507 U.S. at 534; Isbrandtsen, 343 U.S. at 783.11

Does this amount to a clear statement rule? No, Congress need not attach an express disclaimer to a statute that “this statute hereby abrogates the common law.” See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“This interpretative presumption is not [] one that entails a requirement of clear statement, to the effect that Congress must state precisely any intention to overcome the presumption’s application to a given statutory scheme.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts §52 (2012) (a change in common law “need not be express”). Instead, evidence that the statute supplants the common law can be implied when the statute “’speaks directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.” Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).[12]

The Court then explains why §7502 meets these tests:

…§7502 abrogates the common-law mailbox rule because the Act “speaks directly” to the same question as the common-law rule. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534. Section 7502 mirrors the two presumptions that the common-law rule afforded: the presumption of timeliness and the presumption of delivery. See §7502(a), (c). In doing so it directly addresses the common-law rule's question. For taxpayers, §7502 provides a complete, if slightly narrower, set of mailbox presumptions. And that supplants the common law without the need for an express statement or unavoidable conflict. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 319–20 (noting that when a statute thoroughly addresses an issue, “there is no basis for a federal court to impose more stringent limitations . . . by reference to federal common law”); Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. 58, 93 (1829) (explaining that a court cannot “resort to the common law” when the statute does not contain “a causus omissus; but a complete scheme”).[13]

Hence, the Court concluded that the taxpayer cannot rely on the presumption of delivery provided by the common law mailbox rule. Instead, the Court emphasized that the taxpayer should have followed the procedures stipulated in IRC §7502 to obtain the presumption of delivery, as the statute supersedes the mailbox rule for this particular purpose.:

In short, Pond cannot resort to the common-law presumption of delivery. He must proceed under the statute. And §7502 makes clear when the presumption of delivery can apply to a taxpayer filing: certified and registered mailings. See §7502(c). Because Pond did not send his 2013 refund claim by certified or registered mail, he does not satisfy the statute's requirements. Thus, he is not entitled to a presumption of delivery.[14]

But the Taxpayer is Allowed to Attempt to Demonstrate Actual Physical Delivery to the IRS

In contrast to the District Court’s ruling, the panel, upon reviewing the alleged facts presented by the taxpayer, determined that there is a possibility for the taxpayer to demonstrate the actual physical delivery of the claim for refund to the IRS. It is worth noting that both IRC §7502 and the common law mailbox rule are only relevant if the taxpayer is unable to establish the actual timely physical delivery of the claim.

Is Pond out of luck just because he cannot rely on a presumption of delivery? No. He can still proceed if he has plausibly alleged that his claim was physically delivered to the IRS. The district court held that Pond “is unable to show” physical delivery and that his allegations of physical delivery are “implausible.” Pond v. United States, No. 1:21CV83, 2022 WL 1105031, at *6–7 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 13, 2022). We disagree. Affording the complaint all reasonable inferences, Pond adequately alleged physical delivery. So his claim survives the government’s motion to dismiss.

The complaint directly alleges the 2013 claim was “physically delivered to the IRS service center in Holtsville, New York, in accordance with standard postal delivery practices and in accordance with IRS guidelines.” J.A. 7. The government argues that this is a “mere conclusory and speculative allegation[].” Government Br. at 20–21 (citing Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013)). Perhaps, but Pond elsewhere supported this conclusion with three factual allegations. These well-pled factual allegations — and their resulting inferences — make physical delivery plausible.[15]

The first allegation is that the document was postmarked on July 18, 2017:

First, Pond alleged that the envelope containing the 2013 claim “was postmarked with a date of July 18, 2017[.]” J.A. 7. The fact that the document was postmarked for delivery — which we accept as true — suggests that the document made it to its destination. This is the very idea underlying the presumptions of delivery: we can expect the U.S. Postal Service to do its job with some reliability. But if we allowed an allegation of a postmark alone to suffice for showing physical delivery, then that would effectively afford a “backdoor” presumption of delivery. So Pond must show more.[16]

Additionally, the taxpayer provided testimony stating that they had filed both the 2012 and 2013 claims within the same envelope. It is evident that the IRS processed the 2012 claim, which initially supports the taxpayer’s argument:

Second, Pond alleged that his 2012 and 2013 claims were sent in a single envelope. The 2012 claim was paid. A reasonable inference from the fact that the IRS paid Pond’s 2012 claim is that they timely received it at IRS Holtsville. If both the 2012 claim and the 2013 claim were in the same envelope, then another reasonable inference is that IRS Holtsville received Pond’s 2013 claim at the same time.[17]

However, the Court acknowledges the possibility that the IRS may have acquired the 2012 claim through an alternative method or recognized the initial error made by the agency in presuming additional tax was owed for the 2012 return.

True, there are other possibilities. The IRS might have refunded Pond his 2012 overpayment without a filed claim. See §6230(d)(5). Or the IRS may have paid Pond’s 2012 claim based on a duplicate copy of the claim that he sent to IRS Andover in connection with his requested interest refund. These other possible scenarios show that Pond’s preferred inference — that IRS Holtsville received the envelope with Pond’s 2012 and 2013 claims — is far from certain. But the plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We are required to draw all factual inferences in Pond’s favor, so long as they are “reasonable.” See Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 253. Notwithstanding other possibilities, one reasonable inference is that IRS Holtsville received Pond’s envelope. And that inference would support a plausible claim.[18]

Lastly, it is important to recall that the IRS issued a notice indicating the “date of claims received” as July 17, 2017. This statement, accepted as written by the IRS itself, serves as evidence that the IRS did indeed receive the claim well before the deadline for filing the claim.

Third, Pond alleged that the letter he received from the IRS denying his 2013 claim listed the “date of claims received” as July 17, 2017. J.A. 11. We cannot ignore — in deciding whether Pond plausibly alleged timely filing — that the IRS itself prepared a document listing a timely date as the “[d]ate of claims received.” J.A. 84.[19]

The Court acknowledges the argument put forth by the IRS, which contends that the IRS statement must be incorrect since the taxpayer testified to mailing the claims on July 18th.

The government responds to this last point with a great deal of hand-waving. It says that, under Pond’s own narrative, the claims could not have been delivered by July 17, 2017. After all, Pond alleged that, while he signed the refund claims on July 17, 2017, he did not place them in the mail until a day later, July 18, 2017. A letter cannot arrive a day before it was sent. But cf. Stephen W. Hawking, A Briefer History of Time (2008) (explaining when it might be possible to arrive at your destination before departing). So, the government claims, the IRS obviously put the wrong date on the letter. It was a simple mistake. The government even offers an explanation: The agent who authored the denial letter was surely referencing a later copy of the 2013 claim that Pond faxed over, well after the deadline.[20]

However, the panel also highlights that this mistake made by the IRS does not necessarily establish that the IRS never received the claim.

But just because the IRS used the wrong date does not mean that they never received a timely copy of Pond’s 2013 claim. Perhaps the denial letter’s author got the date from a subsequent fax. But it is also plausible that the letter’s author got the date from the original — and timely — copy of the 2013 claim. And if that is the case, then the claim may well have been received before the deadline. As Pond notes, “given the comedy of errors by the Holtsville service center, using the date Pond signed his 2013 Amended Return as the date his claim was received would be the least egregious error committed by the IRS in this refund saga.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. In any event, at this stage we need not conduct a searching inquiry into why the IRS listed a timely “date of claims received.” It just matters that they did so. Again, the plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.[21]

The panel concludes that the District Court had erred by granting summary judgement to the IRS based on the judge’s conclusion that proving timely filing wasn’t possible for Mr. Pond.

This shows the error in dismissing his complaint at this stage. The district court reasoned that Pond “cannot show actual physical delivery or receipt by the IRS, since, according to the Complaint, the IRS has no record of receiving the return.” Pond, 2022 WL 1105031, at *7. But this misreads Pond’s complaint. It alleges that: “After inquiring again through counsel about the status of the 2013 refund, Plaintiff learned that the agents attempting to locate the 2013 Form 1040X were unable to find it anywhere in the system.” J.A. 10 (emphasis added). That some IRS agents could not locate Pond’s claim on the system does not mean the IRS never received it, nor does it mean that the IRS actually has no records of its delivery. A more exhaustive effort during discovery could reveal something that the initial search missed. So this allegation is compatible with the IRS having record of timely filing. A denial letter listing a timely “date of claims received,” is itself some evidence that his claim was timely filed. On remand, the government may produce evidence supporting their argument that the date they listed as “date of claims received” must have been a mistake. Or, to the contrary, discovery might unearth additional evidence that the 2013 claim was timely filed.

A court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). Here, the jurisdictional facts are in dispute. Pond plausibly alleges that he sent his 2012 and 2013 claims in a single envelope postmarked July 18, 2017. The IRS paid the 2012 claim, so there is a reasonable inference the envelope was physically delivered. True, there are other scenarios explaining why the 2012 — and not the 2013 — claim was paid. And while one scenario gives the court jurisdiction, others don’t. But we shouldn’t be picking among them at this stage. See Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.

Instead, we must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Pond. After doing so, we find that Pond plausibly alleged in his complaint that his 2013 claim was physically delivered to the IRS before the statutory deadline. That is enough to show that the district court has jurisdiction within the United States’s sovereign-immunity waiver under §1364(a) to hear his claim. So Pond’s complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).[22]

Summary – The Task in Front of Mr. Pond is Difficult, but He Is Allowed to Attempt to Show Timely Delivery

Note that the panel did not determine that the claim had ever been delivered or that, if it was delivered, that it could meet the timeliness requirement. Rather, Mr. Pond can attempt to prove that actual delivery:

Pond plausibly alleges that his claim for a refund on his 2013 taxes was physically delivered to the IRS before the statutory deadline. If true, then Pond’s suit falls within the United States’s sovereign-immunity waiver, and the district court has jurisdiction. The district court’s order holding otherwise is thus vacated.[23]

Returning to the crucial practical lesson to be learned from this case, it is evident that Mr. Pond has encountered this arduous challenge due to the failure to utilize the provisions outlined in IRC §7502 to secure prima facie evidence of the timely filing of the 2013 claim. As the opinion concludes:

But Pond cannot rely on a presumption of delivery. Section 7502 is clear: only registered and certified mail are presumed delivered. And because the statute “speaks directly” to that presumption, it displaces the common-law presumption that might otherwise help Pond. Pond could have mailed his 2013 claim by registered or certified mail and been protected by the statutory presumption. He chose not to, so he must show physical delivery on remand.[24]

It is essential to emphasize the significance of the final sentence when advising clients on the seemingly routine task of filing documents with the IRS. This case serves as a reminder to clients about the importance of following the prescribed procedures and utilizing the available provisions found in IRC §7502 to establish compelling evidence of timely filing.

[1] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023, https://www.taxnotes.com/research/federal/court-documents/court-opinions-and-orders/fourth-circuit-finds-tax-refund-suit-was-improperly-dismissed/7gs17 (retrieved May 28, 2023).

[2] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[3] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[4] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[5] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[6] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[7] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[8] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[9] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[10] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[11] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[12] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[13] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[14] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[15] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[16] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[17] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[18] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[19] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[20] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[21] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[22] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[23] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023

[24] Pond v. United States, Docket No. 22-1537, CA4, May 26, 2023