Section 6213(a) Deficiency Petitions After Laurenzano v. Commissioner: The Fourth Circuit Reaffirms Equitable Tolling and Dismantles the First Circuit’s Mandatory Rule
Laurenzano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 25-2020. 4th Circuit, November 18, 2026
For decades, tax controversy practitioners operated under an unyielding procedural orthodoxy: the 90-day deadline under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6213(a) to petition the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of a deficiency was strictly jurisdictional. Under that regime, missing the deadline by a single day slammed the courthouse doors shut, precluding any judicial review prior to assessment and payment. That foundational assumption has rapidly eroded. On November 18, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its published opinion in Laurenzano v. Commissioner, firmly holding that the statutory filing deadline in I.R.C. § 6213(a) is an ordinary, nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule and that it is subject to the traditional presumption of equitable tolling.
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, while directly confronting and rejecting the First Circuit’s contrary decision in Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, which had classified the deadline as nonjurisdictional yet strictly mandatory. For CPAs and Enrolled Agents representing clients before the Internal Revenue Service and evaluating Tax Court litigation strategies, Laurenzano provides an authoritative synthesis of modern jurisdictional jurisprudence and offers critical procedural tools for salvaging deficiency petitions caught in extraordinary circumstances.
Factual Context and the Taxpayer’s Request for Relief
The controversy in Laurenzano v. Commissioner arose from a routine statutory notice of deficiency issued under I.R.C. § 6212(a). On September 9, 2024, the IRS mailed a notice of deficiency to Peter Laurenzano’s residence in Maryland, determining an income tax deficiency of $14,151.87. In conformity with standard IRS deficiency notices, the letter advised Laurenzano that he had 90 days—or 150 days if addressed to a person outside the United States—to contest the proposed deficiency by filing a petition with the Tax Court.
According to Laurenzano, when the statutory notice arrived at his Maryland home, he was away on an extended fishing trip spanning Florida and the Bahamas. Operating under the mistaken assumption that his travel to the Bahamas qualified him for the extended foreign-taxpayer deadline, Laurenzano calculated his filing window under the 150-day rule. However, Laurenzano missed even that expanded window: the Tax Court did not receive his petition until February 19, 2025—163 days after the IRS mailed the notice of deficiency.
The Commissioner moved to dismiss Laurenzano’s petition for lack of jurisdiction on grounds of untimeliness. In response, Laurenzano requested equitable relief, urging the court to excuse the delay. The Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion and dismissed the petition. Relying on historical precedent, the Tax Court held that “even if the 150-day period were determined to apply” to Laurenzano, he failed to file within that timeframe, and the court possessed “no authority to extend this 90 day . . . period” for equitable reasons. Facing an immediate assessment under I.R.C. § 6213(c), Laurenzano timely appealed to the Fourth Circuit under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1), requesting that the dismissal be vacated and arguing that § 6213(a)’s deadline is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.
The Clear Statement Framework and the Jurisdictional Question
Reviewing the Tax Court’s legal conclusions and jurisdictional dismissal de novo (McLane v. Commissioner, 24 F.4th 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2022)), the Fourth Circuit divided its inquiry into two successive questions: first, whether the filing deadline in I.R.C. § 6213(a) is jurisdictional; and second, if nonjurisdictional, whether the deadline is subject to equitable tolling.
Writing for a unanimous panel joined by Judges King and Wynn, Judge Agee anchored the court’s jurisdictional analysis in the “demanding” clear-statement rule formulated in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006), and recently reaffirmed in Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 275 (2025). Under this doctrine, a statutory threshold is jurisdictional only if the legislature “clearly states” that the limitation cabins a court’s adjudicatory capacity rather than merely regulating the procedural duties of litigants. As the Supreme Court recognized in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022), jurisdictional rules cannot be waived or forfeited, must be policed sua sponte, and forbid equitable exceptions. Conversely, claim-processing rules promote the orderly progress of litigation, may be waived or forfeited, and are presumptively open to equitable tolling.
Applying these canons to the text of I.R.C. § 6213(a), the Fourth Circuit scrutinized the operative sentence:
“Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or any legal holding in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.”
Borrowing from the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820, 831 (6th Cir. 2025), Judge Agee observed that “[n]otably absent from this language is a ‘directive[] to courts,’ a ‘reference to jurisdiction,’ and ‘language demarcat[ing] a court’s power.’” On its face, the text addresses what “the taxpayer may” do within the specified timeframe, speaking directly to party obligations rather than judicial adjudicatory power.
The panel reinforced this textual reading by contrasting the first sentence of § 6213(a) with the explicit jurisdictional restriction located two sentences later in the very same subsection:
“The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is subject of such petition.”
This internal contrast demonstrated that “Congress knew how to connect a deadline and a jurisdictional grant when it so chose.” While Congress explicitly stripped the Tax Court of jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief or issue refunds absent a timely petition, it pointedly declined to attach similar jurisdictional language to the general power to redetermine deficiencies under the first sentence. Citing the Third Circuit’s landmark decision in Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2023), the panel emphasized that this textual disparity confirms Congress deliberately withheld jurisdictional consequences from the deficiency petition deadline.
The Fourth Circuit found further statutory proof across the broader Internal Revenue Code, where Congress repeatedly tethered deadlines to express jurisdictional grants—such as I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) for innocent spouse relief (“and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction... if such petition is filed” timely) and I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1) for interest abatement actions (“The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction... if such action is brought” timely).
Finally, the Fourth Circuit compared § 6213(a) to the Collection Due Process (CDP) deadline reviewed in Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204. In Boechler, I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) included the filing deadline and the phrase “(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)” in the exact same sentence. Even with that grammatical proximity, the Supreme Court held that § 6330(d)(1) was nonjurisdictional because multiple plausible readings existed. Judge Agee reasoned:
“If the filing deadline in Boechler fell short of being jurisdictional, it is hard to see how the more attenuated 90-day deadline in § 6213(a) is jurisdictional. The statute in Boechler contained at least some grammatical connections between the jurisdictional language and the deadline... But there is no such jurisdictional language at all grammatically related to the 90-day deadline in § 6213(a).”
Dismantling Drive-By Precedents and Administrative Arguments
The Commissioner urged the Fourth Circuit to maintain the jurisdictional bar based on prior circuit precedent, including Kiker v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1955), and Lundy v. IRS, 45 F.3d 856 (4th Cir. 1995). The panel flatly refused, classifying those decisions as classic “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” that lack any reasoned textual analysis and warrant “no precedential effect” under Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511, and Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 160 (2023).
The court also rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished post-Boechler decision in Allen v. Commissioner, No. 22-12537, 2022 WL 17825934 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022), which had maintained that § 6213(a) remained jurisdictional because Boechler did not directly overrule prior circuit law. Judge Agee pointedly observed that Allen “underestimates the strength and significance of Arbaugh and its progeny, including Boechler.”
Addressing the Commissioner’s policy argument that treating § 6213(a) as nonjurisdictional disrupts tax administration and clashes with related Code provisions, the Fourth Circuit held that “ministerial consequences of a nonjurisdictional deadline are not ‘unmistakable evidence, on par with express language addressing the court’s jurisdiction,’ necessary to satisfy a clear-statement rule” (Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 418 (2023)). Thus, the panel held that § 6213(a)’s deadline is an ordinary claim-processing rule.
The Equitable Tolling Presumption and the Rebuttal Standard
Once a time limitation is categorized as nonjurisdictional, it enjoys a robust, long-standing presumption that it is subject to equitable tolling (Boechler, 596 U.S. at 209; Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). The doctrine pauses the running of a limitations period when a litigant demonstrates (1) that they have pursued their rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in their way and prevented timely filing (Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014)).
This presumption governs unless there is “good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply” (Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 7 (2023); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997)). As the Supreme Court articulated in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2026), a statute can rebut the presumption when it speaks in strict, mandatory terms (such as “shall”), sets forth limitations in an unusually emphatic or highly detailed technical manner, contains an extensive scheme of explicit equitable exceptions, or provides an exceptionally long limitations period (such as the 12-year period in United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 49 (1998)).
The Fourth Circuit concluded that § 6213(a) displays none of these rebuttal characteristics. Textually, the statute uses the permissive term “may” rather than mandatory phrasing. Structurally, the 90-day window is relatively short and appears within a statutory framework that is “unusually protective of taxpayers and a scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, often initiate the process” (Boechler, 596 U.S. at 209).
Analysis of Statutory Exceptions and Critique of the First Circuit’s Outlier Position
A major contribution of the Laurenzano decision is its exhaustive examination of the circuit split regarding whether § 6213(a) can be equitably tolled. While the Second Circuit (Buller v. Commissioner, 160 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2025)), Third Circuit (Culp, 75 F.4th at 205), Sixth Circuit (Oquendo, 148 F.4th at 833–34), and Eighth Circuit (Maniktala v. Commissioner, 186 F.4th 548, 555 (8th Cir. 2026)) all held that § 6213(a) permits equitable tolling, the First Circuit broke rank in Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 188 F.4th 39 (1st Cir. 2026). In Kyick Holdings, the First Circuit concluded that § 6213(a) is nonjurisdictional but strictly mandatory, asserting that Congress intended to preclude equitable tolling because nine statutory exceptions throughout the Code already account for equitable considerations.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Kyick Holdings as an “outlier” and dismantled its nine-exception framework:
First, Judge Agee identified that only four exceptions are genuinely relevant to § 6213(a):
- The exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays in the District of Columbia as the last day (I.R.C. § 6213(a));
- The safe-harbor rule treating petitions filed by the date specified on the notice of deficiency as timely (I.R.C. § 6213(a));
- The tolling suspension during extended correction periods for certain excise taxes (I.R.C. § 6213(e)); and
- The statutory tolling suspension during Chapter 11 bankruptcy stays and for 60 days thereafter (I.R.C. § 6213(f)).
These four exceptions, the Fourth Circuit observed, are neither numerous nor highly technical. As Judge Ambro noted in Culp, four exceptions pale in comparison to the six detailed technical limits in Brockamp (governing tax refund claims under § 6511) or the fifteen intricate exceptions in Arellano (governing veterans’ benefits).
Second, the Fourth Circuit showed why the remaining five “exceptions” cited by the First Circuit are entirely irrelevant:
- The 150-day window: The 150-day rule for notices addressed outside the United States is not an equitable exception or extension to the 90-day deadline; it is an independent, baseline statutory deadline for foreign-addressed taxpayers.
- External Code tolling provisions: The other four provisions cited in Kyick Holdings—I.R.C. § 7451(b)(1) (inaccessible filing locations), § 7508(a)(1)(C) (combat zones), § 7508A(a)(1) (disaster areas), and § 7502(a) (the timely-mailing-as-timely-filing rule)—are external gap-fillers. Crucially, the Supreme Court in Boechler specifically considered these exact external provisions (combat zones and disaster relief) and held that their existence in the wider Tax Code does not rebut the presumption of equitable tolling for a specific petition deadline.
Third, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court’s ruling in Enbridge Energy. In Enbridge, the Supreme Court held that the civil removal deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) was not subject to equitable tolling because it used mandatory “shall” language and was interwoven with six express statutory exceptions that directly modified and incorporated § 1446(b)(1)’s timeline. By contrast, § 6213(a) employs permissive language and lacks interwoven, cross-referencing exceptions that would be rendered superfluous by equitable tolling.
Insights from Sister Circuit Jurisprudence
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling is best understood alongside key insights from the sister circuit opinions:
- The Section 7459(d) Res Judicata Conundrum: In Culp, Buller, and Maniktala, the IRS argued that treating § 6213(a) as nonjurisdictional would severely harm taxpayers under I.R.C. § 7459(d). Section 7459(d) provides that if the Tax Court dismisses a petition, that dismissal acts as a decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the IRS, creating res judicata that bars a subsequent refund suit under I.R.C. § 7422—unless the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction. The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits answered that this concern represents a remote, “theoretical possibility” that “seems seldom, if ever, to occur,” and cannot substitute for a clear statement from Congress.
- Administrative Impact Realities: In Culp and Buller, the courts highlighted statistical data demonstrating that deficiency petitions represent a microscopic fraction of IRS enforcement. In Culp, amicus data revealed that out of over two million deficiency notices issued in FY 2021, only 34,049 petitions were filed, and roughly 600 were dismissed as untimely. Buller noted that equitable tolling could impact barely 0.011% of the tax base, disproving the Commissioner’s claim that equitable tolling would cause the tax collection “Jenga tower” to crumble.
- The Sixth Circuit’s Particularized Inquiry: In Oquendo, the Sixth Circuit articulated the five-factor balancing test the Tax Court must apply when evaluating equitable tolling on remand: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) lack of constructive knowledge; (3) diligence in pursuing rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the Commissioner; and (5) reasonableness in remaining ignorant. Oquendo emphasizes that taxpayers bear a heavy affirmative burden to establish extraordinary circumstances beyond their control.
- The Mailbox Rule and Reasonable Diligence: In Kyick Holdings and Maniktala, taxpayers faced severe postal delivery breakdowns. Kyick Holdings established that the IRS satisfies its statutory burden by mailing a notice to the taxpayer’s “last known address” under Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2(a), even if returned as undeliverable, making equitable tolling the sole potential safety valve for taxpayers who never received timely notice through no fault of their own.
Application to the Facts of Laurenzano and Appellate Disposition
Applying the law to Peter Laurenzano’s appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s fundamental premises:
“The Tax Court erred in dismissing Laurenzano’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. As we have explained, § 6213(a) does not divest the Tax Court of the power to hear an untimely petition based on the 90-day deadline, and consequently the Tax Court also has the authority to apply equitable tolling based on the facts of a particular case.”
Because the Tax Court erroneously believed it lacked all adjudicatory authority, it never evaluated Laurenzano’s equitable arguments. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Significantly, the panel explicitly declined to rule on the merits of Laurenzano’s equitable tolling claim:
“In holding that equitable tolling is available for petitioners who miss § 6213(a)’s deadline, we offer no view on whether Laurenzano is entitled to any equitable relief in this case. That is a question for the Tax Court on remand, Boechler, 596 U.S. at 211, to determine in the first instance.”
Tax practitioners should recognize the formidable hurdle facing Laurenzano on remand. Equitable tolling requires extraordinary external impediments coupled with relentless diligence. It is questionable whether embarking on an extended recreational fishing trip to the Bahamas and misinterpreting the statutory foreign-taxpayer deadline constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond the taxpayer’s control, or merely an instance of neglect and legal error, which traditionally forecloses equitable tolling (Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96).
Strategic Implications for Tax Practitioners
For CPAs, EAs, and tax attorneys, Laurenzano and its companion circuit decisions fundamentally reshape deficiency dispute representation:
- Affirmative Defense Pleading: Because § 6213(a) is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar, untimeliness is an affirmative defense that the Commissioner must raise or risk forfeiting (Culp, 75 F.4th at 202). Practitioners representing taxpayers with marginal filing dates should carefully inspect IRS pleadings for potential waiver.
- Establishing Extraordinary Circumstances: Practitioners seeking equitable tolling must build a robust, documented factual record demonstrating extraordinary impediments—such as serious medical incapacity, severe natural disasters, or proven postal misdirection—and affirmative diligence immediately upon discovering the deficiency notice.
- Geographic Circuit Split Realities: While taxpayers in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits now enjoy the protections of equitable tolling, taxpayers subject to First Circuit appellate jurisdiction (Kyick Holdings) or Eleventh Circuit venue (Allen) remain strictly barred. Multistate practitioners must evaluate appellate venue rules under I.R.C. § 7482(b) when advising clients on petition deadlines.
- Supreme Court Resolution Ahead: With five circuits aligned in favor of equitable tolling and the First Circuit directly opposed, an active circuit split now exists on whether § 6213(a) is mandatory. The Supreme Court will almost certainly be called upon to resolve this tension and provide uniform guidance across all tax jurisdictions.
Prepared with assistance from Gemini Notebook.
